Pro-active approaches to the identification of emerging risks in the food chain: Retrospective case studies. by Hagenaars, T.H.J. et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pro-active approaches to the identification of emerging risks in the 
food chain: Retrospective case studies 
 
T.J. Hagenaars1, A.R.W. Elbers2, G. Kleter3, F. Kreft4, S.P.J. van Leeuwen5, C. Waalwijk6, 
L.A.P. Hoogenboom3 and H.J.P. Marvin3
 
 
 
1 Animal Sciences Group 
2 Central Institute for Animal Disease Control (CIDC-Lelystad) 
3 RIKILT – Institute of Food Safety 
4 Agrotechnology & Food Innovations 
5 RIVO, Animal Sciences Group 
6 Plant Research International 
Wageningen University and Research Center (WUR) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Report ASG06-I01112 
June 2006 
 
 
Pro-active approaches to the identification of emerging risks in the food chain: 
Retrospective case studies  
 
T.J. Hagenaars, A.R.W. Elbers, G. Kleter, F. Kreft, S.P.J. van Leeuwen, C. Waalwijk, L.A.P. 
Hoogenboom and H.J.P. Marvin 
 
Wageningen University and Research Center (WUR) 
June 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case studies: 
 
Fátima Kreft  
Agrotechnology & Food Innovations  
 
Thomas Hagenaars  
Animal Sciences Group 
 
Armin Elbers 
Central Institute for Animal Disease Control (CIDC-Lelystad) 
 
Cees Waalwijk  
Plant Research International 
 
Gijs Kleter, Hans Marvin, and Ron Hoogenboom  
RIKILT – Institute of Food Safety 
 
Stefan van Leeuwen 
RIVO, Animal Sciences Group 
 
 
Project coordination:  
 
Thomas Hagenaars  
Animal Sciences Group 
 
Index 
 
1. Introduction and summary (Thomas Hagenaars)                  page 3 
1.1 Aim of this work           3 
1.2 The case studies          3 
1.3 Summary of conclusions on pro-activity       4 
1.4 Reference           7 
 
2. Case study: Dioxin in pork meat (Fátima Kreft)          page 9 
2.1 Case description          9 
2.2 Pro-activity paying off and lacking pro-activity               17 
2.3 Conclusions and recommendations                19 
2.4 Sources                    21 
 
3. Case study: The BSE crisis in Great Britain (Thomas Hagenaars)     page 22 
3.1 Case description                   22 
3.2 Pro-activity paying off and lacking pro-activity               24 
3.3 Conclusions and recommendations                33 
3.4 References                   34 
 
4. Case study: The HPAI epidemic in the Netherlands in 2003 (Armin Elbers)               page 36 
4.1 Case description                   36 
4.2 Pro-activity paying off and lacking pro-activity               43 
4.3 Conclusions and recommendations                45 
4.4 References                   46 
 
5. Case study: Equine leukoencephalomalacia in 1989/1990 (Cees Waalwijk)    page 49 
5.1 Case description                   49 
5.2 Conclusions and recommendations                51 
5.3 References                   52
  
6. Case study: Residues of PCBs, dioxins, and organochlorine pesticides in cultured fish  
 (Gijs Kleter, Hans Marvin, Ron Hoogenboom)        page 53 
6.1 Case description                   53 
6.2 Pro-activity paying off and lacking pro-activity               56 
6.3 Conclusions and recommendations                57 
6.4 References                   58
   
7 Case study: Perfluorinated contaminants, a new group of contaminants that accumulate in fish
 (Stefan van Leeuwen)          page 60 
7.1 Case description                   60 
7.2 Pro-activity paying off and lacking pro-activity               61 
7.3 Conclusions and recommendations                62 
7.4 References                   62 
 
Pro-active approaches to the identification of emerging risks in the food chain: Retrospective case studies  
 
 
1. Introduction and summary  
 
Thomas J. Hagenaars  
Quantitative Veterinary Epidemiology, Division of Infectious Diseases, Animal Sciences Group, 
Wageningen University and Research Center 
 
 
1.1 Aim of this work 
 
In this report six case studies are carried out on food-safety and animal-health crises that have 
occurred in the recent past. The aim is to learn from these cases if and how the identification of 
emerging food-safety (and animal-health) risks can be improved by adopting a (more) pro-active 
approach.  
 
In particular, in each case study it was aimed to address to the following questions: 
• Was the detection/identification of the hazard timely or not? 
• From which factors has the detection benefited or could the detection have benefited:  
o pro-active approaches (such as surveillance activities),  
o motivated professionals,  
o specialized expertise,  
o good coordination between actors,  
o a (more) inclusive set of indicators within and outside the food chain. By 
‘indicator’ we mean any observable fact or pattern that may point to the 
emergence of a food-safety risk. 
 
This work was carried out as a project named “Analysis of recent crises in the field of food safety 
and/or animal health” within the Dutch research program “Emerging risks in the Dutch food 
chain”, a program funded by the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (LNV) 
and coordinated by Dr. H.J.P. Marvin, RIKILT – Institute of Food Safety, Wageningen 
University and Research Center. The goal of the research program is to develop a system for pro-
actively approaching the identification of emerging risks in the Dutch food chain. 
The work described in this report serves to inform the development of such a system. 
 
 
 
1.2 The case studies 
 
The six cases to be studied were selected from a list of possible subjects, aiming for coverage of 
most “types” of emerging risks and taking into account the specialist expertise available within 
the six participating research institutions.  
In Table 2.1 below the six crises that have been studied are listed, together with some of their 
characteristics and their broader relevance. 
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Emergence of 
the risk 
Identification or 
detection 
Type of 
hazard 
Broader relevance Case study 
Institute responsible for 
the case study New Re-
emerging 
Early Inter- 
mediate 
Late Chem. Biol
. 
 
Dioxin in pork meat 2004 
A&F 
x    x x  Risks in packed meat; 
Environmental 
contaminants 
Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy (BSE) 
epidemic 1986;  
Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob 
Disease (vCJD) 1996  
ASG 
x 
 
 
x 
 x 
 
 
x 
   x 
 
 
x 
Epidemics of new, 
unknown, agents 
Avian Influenza (AI) 
epidemic 2003  
CIDC 
 x   x  x Epidemics of notifiable 
animal diseases 
Equine leukoencephal- 
omalacia (Fumanisin in 
feedstuff) 1989-1990  
PRI 
 x   x  x Toxicoses 
Environmental 
contaminants in cultured 
salmon 2004  
RIKILT 
 x  x  x  Broad range of 
environmental 
contaminants 
PFCs in wild-catch fish 
2001  
RIVO 
x    x x  Man-made chemicals in 
the environment 
Table 1.1 Overview of the case-study topics of Subproject 1.1. 
 
The case study reports, included below, provide both relevant details on the issues at stake in the 
case studied as well as general insights and recommendations that can be drawn from it. In the 
next paragraph I summarize what the six case studies have told us about the particular issue of 
pro-activity in emerging-risk identification. 
 
 
1.3 Summary of conclusions on pro-activity 
 
In Table 1.2 the case-study findings with respect to pro-activity have been briefly summarized. 
From this summary I obtain the following overall picture. I find it useful to make a distinction 
between “non-holistic” pro-activity based on indicators within the food chain and “holistic” pro-
activity based on indicators outside the food chain. The latter is related to the holistic approach as 
laid out in the PERIAPT project report [Noteborn et al.  2005], which proposes a “host 
environment analysis” to identify indicators outside the food chain. 
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Case study  “Non-holistic” pro-
activity that paid off or 
was lacking in the 
incident or crisis 
Recommendations for 
“non-holistic” pro-
activity  
Recommendations for 
holistic pro-activity 
(using indicators outside 
the food chain) 
Dioxin in pork 
meat 2004  
Paid off: Routine 
surveillance of dairy 
industry (although early 
detection was mere luck), 
specialist expertise at 
AID (General Inspection 
Department) and 
availability of dioxin 
database 
- Changes in food –
production process being 
introduced in the HACCP 
plan of the company  
- Case-specific: mapping 
of sources of dioxins 
Monitoring changes in 
production processes, 
esp. those affecting waste 
streams. Indicators are 
changes in:  
- Legislation 
- Purchasing pattern of 
technical auxiliary 
substances 
- Market prices of 
materials 
Bovine 
Spongiform 
Encephalopathy 
(BSE) epidemic 
1986 
Paid off: Surveillance 
structure and specialist 
expertise 
Optimizing passive 
surveillance structure 
Assessment of risks when  
feedstuff formula changes 
(Though unlikely that this 
would have made any 
difference for BSE crisis) 
Assessment of risks when 
waste-stream process 
changes (Though unlikely 
that this would have 
made any difference for 
BSE crisis) 
Variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob 
Disease (vCJD) 
1996  
Paid off: Dedicated 
surveillance structure 
including specialist 
expertise. 
Lacking: Balanced risk 
communication  
- Recognizing 
uncertainties 
- Enforcing precautionary 
measures taken 
None 
Avian Influenza 
(AI) epidemic 
2003  
Paid off: Specialist 
expertise at Animal 
Health Service (AHS) 
Lacking: Action taken 
upon occurrence of LPAI, 
communication between 
veterinary practitioners 
and AHS, farmer’s and 
vet’s sense of 
responsibility for 
notifying a severe clinical 
situation 
- Specific to AI: Lowered 
notification thresholds 
when LPAI has been 
detected 
- Generic for notifiable 
animal diseases: 
stimulating better and 
earlier communication of 
on-farm clinical picture to 
authorities 
Attention to higher risks 
of exposure to chemical 
contaminants and disease 
agents when introducing 
(or promoting  
introduction of) 
alternative production 
systems involving 
outdoor housing 
Equine 
leukoencephal- 
omalacia 
(Fumanisin in 
feedstuff) 1989-
1990  
Lacking:  Surveillance 
activities (testing of 
suspect batches), 
precautionary measures 
(re-routing of batches) 
 
- Monitoring indicators 
for plant stress 
- Adjusting maize 
harvesting procedures 
and storage conditions 
- Testing and re-routing 
of suspect batches  
- Diversification of horse 
feed 
Monitoring indicators for 
plant stress 
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Environmental 
contaminants in 
cultured salmon 
2004  
Paid off: Initiatives for 
the mitigation of the risk 
per se had been 
undertaken. 
Lacking: Strategic 
preparation to avoid 
crises surrounding 
contaminations that are 
not exceeding current 
food-safety thresholds 
 
 
- Pro-active development 
of  authorities’ 
communication strategy, 
collaboratively with 
stakeholders 
- Attention to 
contaminants: 
 * going or recycling into 
environment and/or feed 
chain,   
 * with levels 
approaching thresholds,  
 - Attention to products: 
 * with strongly 
increasing 
production and 
consumption,  
 * made increasingly 
using alternative 
production technology  
Attention to: 
- Compounds for which 
many toxicological 
studies are conducted, 
which can cause 
standards setting to 
change; particularly for 
effects of combinations of 
substances. 
- Products with a strong 
health image, of which 
contaminations can 
become a sensitive item 
for the public. 
PFCs in wild-catch 
fish 2001  
Lacking: Risk assessment 
related to new classes of 
chemicals: the PFC 
problem was detected 
only after decades of 
production,  during which 
the presence of these 
substances had become 
ubiquitous in the global 
environment and in 
humans 
Risk assessment related 
to PFCs: current national 
initiatives should be 
integrated and further 
developed to enable risk 
assessment    
Attention to industry’s 
changes: alternative -but 
very similar- chemicals 
will be developed to 
replace the currently 
banned PFCs.  
The toxic en 
bioaccumulation potential 
of these alternatives 
should be investigated to 
avoid replacing the 
original ‘problem’ with a 
new one. 
Chemical industries 
follow the ‘alternative 
chemical’ strategy for a 
range of chemicals.  
Table 1.2 Brief summary of the case-study results with respect to the issue of pro-activity.  
 
 
Non-holistic pro-activity 
 
As is apparent from Table 2.2, in all cases studied it was found that (more) pro-active efforts 
within the food chain would have been useful or desirable. So I conclude that more pro-activity 
can be beneficial in the first place within the food chain. For the elucidation of the detailed 
recommendations in each specific case studied I refer to the case-study reports below. One 
important issue in this context is the “human factor”:  the motives of the relevant parties in the 
chain as well as the incentives that these motives may produce in the face of food-safety 
regulations. An example of how this issue can compromise pro-activity related to re-emerging 
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risks is the low compliance to syndrome-reporting procedures for notifiable diseases of livestock. 
This example is illustrated in detail by the case study on Avian Influenza.  
 
Holistic pro-activity  
 
Pro-active approaches using information from outside the food chain are recommended in all six 
case studies, as listed in Table 2.2. In several cases these recommendations mention a specific 
type of indicator, such as changes in legislation, of waste streams of industries, of market 
volumes and prices of certain substances, trends in toxicological research, and transitions to 
different animal housing systems (although this latter indicator could be viewed as a “within-
chain” indicator). 
One important “holistic indicator” common to all three case studies of totally new risks (dioxin in 
pork meat, BSE, and PFCs in wild-catch fish) is “changes in the waste stream”.  In the cases of 
dioxin in pork meat and PFCs in wild-catch fish, the case studies show that when the production 
changes caused concurrent waste-stream changes, no assessments of risks via the waste-stream 
were made. E.g., for the case of dioxin in pork meat, it is concluded that production changes 
affecting the waste stream should be introduced into the HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical 
Control Point) plan of the food-producing company. For the case of PFCs in wild-catch fish it is 
concluded that current initiatives regarding risk assessment related to new classes of chemicals 
should be integrated and further developed. Thus it seems that a “change in the waste stream” 
should be viewed in the first place as a process change that necessitates a risk assessment (made 
compulsory by legislation and enforced by inspection) rather than as an abstract indicator for 
identifying and prioritizing potential emerging risks.  I note however that such risk assessments 
are not a guarantee for identifying or preventing new food-safety risks arising from the change in 
the waste stream. E.g., in the case of BSE in cattle, if a risk assessment considering TSE risks had 
been made at the time when changes occurred in the rendering systems used in Great Britain, the 
experience with recycling of animal tissue in feed and the knowledge on TSEs available up until 
that time would probably not have led to TSE surveillance of cattle being recommended, but at 
most to scrapie prevalence in sheep being monitored.   
 
The conclusions and recommendations of the six case studies, including the risk indicators 
identified, provide a starting point for the development of a “system” for pro-actively 
approaching the identification of emerging risks in the Dutch food chain. However, due to the 
limited number of six case studies, these conclusions and recommendations do not provide a fully 
balanced or complete overview of all the relevant pro-activity issues across the whole range of 
possible emerging risks in the food chain. For example, one obvious risk indicator for regional or 
national food-safety authorities, not yet mentioned above, is the occurrence of incidents in the 
food chain elsewhere in the world that have the potential to spread to their region or country. 
Therefore, further work is necessary at a later stage to validate the usefulness of any “prototype 
system” against a broad set of potential emerging risks. Furthermore, it may be worthwhile to 
follow up a number of further hints from the six case studies at potential risk indicators other than 
those mentioned above, such as:  
• Recycling of animal material as input for animal production constituting a pathway for risk 
propagation or accumulation (BSE, dioxin in cultured fish) 
• Information on the health risks from certain substances becoming available from 
populations exposed to high doses (dioxin emission incidents, occupational exposure to 
PFOs)  
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1.4 Reference 
 
Noteborn, H.P.J.M, Ooms, B.W., and De Prado, M., Emerging Risks Identification in Food and 
Feed for Human Health, An Approach. VWA- Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority, 
Directorate of Research and Risk Assessment, The Hague, The Netherlands, June 2005. 
http://www.periapt.net/, Last accessed 5 December 2005
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2. Case study: Dioxin in pork meat 
 
Fátima Kreft  
Agrotechnology & Food Innovations, Wageningen University and Research Center 
 
2.1 Case description 
 
2.1.1 Introduction 
 
The case 
This case concerns the contamination of pork meat with dioxin in October – November 2004 
in The Netherlands. The contaminated meat was detected through farm milk with high 
concentration of dioxin (contaminated via the same source as the meat). The farm milk 
contaminated with dioxin was discovered first and from this point other possible 
contaminated products were tracked down. As a result the pork meat contamination with 
dioxin was discovered at an early moment. The Dutch authorities activated the emerging risk 
action plan immediately. Therefore the pig farms suspected of having used contaminated pig 
feed were closed and samples were taken for testing. No pigs fed with the contaminated feed 
entered the packed meat distribution chain.  
The dioxin entered the food chain through the use of contaminated potato peels. The 
contaminated peels were used for the production of animal feeds. The feed products with high 
concentration dioxin were then given to the animals, resulting in milk and meat with too high 
concentrations of dioxin. 
The potato peels were contaminated through the use of marl clay with high concentration of 
dioxin (originating from Germany) in potato processing plants.  During potato processing, 
potatoes are washed and sorted with clay. When using the contaminated clay to wash and sort 
the potatoes, particles of clay adhered to the potatoes peel resulting in high dioxin 
concentrations in the potato peels.  
It is not clear if the contamination of clay has a natural cause or that the contamination is the 
result of environmental pollution (source: The Dutch ministry of agriculture, nature and food 
quality, LNV). However, since 1999 it is known that in some clay sediments natural dioxins 
are present, so it is at least remarkable that this material can be used in the food industry 
without carrying out test checks (source: Kennislink). 
 
What is dioxin 
Dioxin is a generic term for a group of more than 75 chlorinated organic substances, which 
are soluble in fats. Due to this property these substances can accumulate in animals and 
people. Seventeen of the existing dioxins are toxic, of which TCDD (2,3,7,8 
tetrachlorodibenzodioxin) is the most toxic form. 
The toxic effect of dioxin is the result of the binding to cell proteins. Furthermore, it can 
disturb cell growth, which affects the functioning of cells in different parts of the human 
body.  
The toxicity of dioxin was only discovered in the seventies. Some researchers claim that these 
are the most toxic chemicals to which people have been exposed to so far (source: Lenntech). 
 
Sources of dioxin 
Dioxin exists in the environment due to its release during volcanic eruptions and forest fires. 
However, this involves fairly low concentrations compared to the human production of 
dioxin. There are no industrial applications for dioxins, they are by-products of other 
processes as the production of PCBs (poly chlorinated biphenyls), PCPs (poly chlorinated 
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phenols) and herbicides, metal working and the paper industry. During the combusting of 
substances in the presence of chlorine dioxin is also often released. This is for instance the 
case during the combustion of waste and leaded gas (source: Lenntech). Via gas emissions 
and solid residues substances  
can end up in the environment as a result of which everywhere in the environment 
background levels are found because the substance breaks down very slowly (source: 
agriholland). 
 
Dioxin can only be generated when four basic substances are present. Firstly, carbon, oxygen, 
hydrogen and chlorine have to react with each other. The first three substances are present in 
the open air. Chlorine is generally present in the form of common salt (NaCl) in for example 
household waste, paper and carton. Secondly, carbonhydrogens have to be present in the 
waste. Furthermore, metals as copper and cadmium have to be present to support formation of 
dioxin. Finally, the combustion technology has to be favourable, that is a sufficiently high 
temperature, enough time, and favourable oxygen content (source: Lenntech). 
Dioxins are also formed in nature by the so-called white rot fungus which grows on dead 
wood and can produce dioxins from lignin. 
Besides, vegetables as Brussels sprouts, broccoli, and cabbage can contain dioxin-like 
substances.  
Dioxin is also present in tobacco smoke. In this way, an average smoker inhales a quarter of 
the maximum dose that can be consumed safely according to the Dutch Health Board 
(Gezondheidsraad) (source: agriholland). 
 
 
2.1.2 Chronological description of the case  
 
The dioxin entered the food chain through the use of contaminated potato peels. The 
contaminated peels were used for the production of animal feeds. The feed products with high 
concentration dioxin were then given to the animals, resulting in milk and meat with too high 
concentrations of dioxin. The farm/tank milk contaminated with dioxin was discovered first 
and from this point other possible contaminated products were tracked down. As a result the 
pork meat contamination with dioxin was discovered at an early moment and did not enter the 
packed meat distribution chain. 
The potato peels were contaminated through the use of marl clay with high concentration of 
dioxin (originating from Germany) in potato processing plants.  
 
The chronological description of the case is schematically presented in  
Figure 2.1. The red box shows the starting point of the case and the black arrows represent 
the chronological order of the events in this case. The blue dashed boxes and blue dashed 
arrows show the sequence of events that would have taken place if the pig farms had not been 
closed on time. The green boxes and arrows show the events which led to the source of the 
contamination.  
 
In a report of the Dutch animal feed board (PDV) entitled “Assessment incident dioxin 
contamination potato by-products 2004” a very detailed description is presented of the facts 
that have occurred according to the observations of PDV and the animal feed companies 
involved. A chronological list of the actions undertaken during the incident is included in this 
report (see appendix 1). Furthermore, conclusions and recommendations on this incident are 
provided. 
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Figure 2.1: Chronological description of the case 
 
 
2.1.3 Type of risk: re-emerging 
 
Slaughterhouse
Retail/wholesaler Consumer 
Industrial butcher/meat 
pack company
The Netherlands: Marl clay with high 
concentration of dioxin is used in potato 
processing plant to wash and sort potatoes 
Marl Clay from 
Germany 
Milk producing  
company (Lelystad)
Contaminated potato peels (directly used 
as animal feed for milk cows or 
processed into animal feed for pigs) 
Samples of milk controlled by 
NZO; samples with too high 
concentration of Dioxin are found
Milk cows are fed with 
contaminated peels
Pig feed producing 
company 
Pig farms 
France Belgium 
End of the events 
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Food contaminated with dioxin or exposure to dioxin is a re-emerging type of risk. Dioxin is 
found worldwide as a result of natural processes and can be formed as an industrial waste 
product in different ways as described in the introduction of this report.  
Although the toxicity of dioxin has only been discovered in the seventies, there have been 
registrations of incidents with dioxin beyond this period. Most of the dioxin incidents in the 
eighties took place in areas close to waste incineration stations. An overview of dioxin 
incidents is provided hereafter (source: Wikipedia). The described incidents also stress the 
possible consequences of exposure to dioxin. In appendix 2 a more extensive list of dioxin 
incidents is provided.      
 
Dioxin exposure incidents 
- In 1963 a dioxin cloud escapes after an explosion in a Philips-Duphar plant (now Solvay 
Group) near Amsterdam. Four people die of dioxin poisoning, and 50 more suffer severe 
health problems. The dioxin was a by-product of herbicid production.  
- In 1976 large amounts of dioxin were released in an industrial accident at Seveso, 
although no human fatalities or birth defects occurred.  
- In 1978, dioxin was one of the contaminants that forced the evacuation of the Love Canal 
neighborhood of Niagara Falls, New York.  
- Dioxin also caused the 1983 evacuation of Times Beach, Missouri. 
- In 1997, chicken meat with high concentration in dioxins being sold in Mississippi was 
found. The source was naturally contaminated ball clay which was used as desiccant or 
drying material in the production of soybean meal used in the chicken feed.    
- In the 1960s, parts of the Spolana chemical plant in Neratovice, Czechoslovakia, were 
heavily contaminated by dioxins, when the herbicide 2,4,5-T (also a component of Agent 
Orange) was produced there. Workers in this factory were exposed to high concentrations 
of dioxins at that time. Dozens of them fell seriously ill. A possibly large amount of 
dioxins was flushed from the factory into the Labe river during the 2002 European flood. 
No direct consequences of this incident have thus far been recorded. 
- In May 1999, there was a dioxin crisis in Belgium: quantities of dioxin had entered the 
food chain through contaminated animal feed. 7,000,000 chickens and 60,000 pigs had to 
be slaughtered. The scandal that followed caused a landslide in the elections one month 
later.  
- In a 2001 case study 1, physicians reported clinical changes in a 30 year old woman who 
had been exposed to a massive dosage (144,000 pg/g blood fat) of dioxin equal to 16,000 
times the normal body level; the highest dose of dioxin ever recorded in a human. She 
suffered from chloracne, nausea, vomiting, epigastric pain, loss of appetite, leukocytosis, 
anemia, amenorrhoea and thrombocytopenia. However, other notable laboratory tests, 
such as immune function tests, were relatively normal. The same study also covered a 
second subject who had received a dosage equivalent to 2,900 times the normal level, who 
apparently suffered no notable negative effects other than chloracne. These patients were 
provided with olestra to accelerate dioxin elimination.  
- In 2004, a notable individual case of dioxin poisoning, Ukrainian politician Viktor 
Yushchenko was exposed to the second-largest measured dose of dioxins, according to the 
reports of the physicians responsible for diagnosing him. This is the first known case of a 
single high dose of TCDD dioxin poisoning. Experts say that it could take two to three 
years for the disfigurement of his face to clear up. 
                                                 
1 A Geusau, K Abraham, K Geissler, MO Sator, G Sting, and E Tschachler (2001) Severe 2,3,7,8-
Tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD) Intoxication: Clinical and Laboratory Effects. Environmental Health 
Perspectives Volume 109, Number 8.   
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Due to strict measures and rules, the exposure to dioxin nowadays has been substantially 
decreased. In breast milk the typical amount of dioxin is now half of what was measured 10-
15 years ago. Furthermore, about 8% of people have a higher level of dioxins in their body 
than the maximum deemed acceptable (Source: www.varken.net). 
 
 
2.1.4 Relevance to human food safety  
 
Dioxins in the food chain 
Dioxin ends up in people due to the consumption of food, because it accumulates in livestock. 
Fish, meat, eggs and dairy products are well-known sources of dioxin and cause 90% of the 
exposure. The Dutch government has determined a maximum allowed dose of dioxin in food, 
on which inspections are carried out. Unborn children can be exposed to dioxin as it can 
penetrate through the placenta and by drinking breast milk. In the industry or during 
application of herbicides people may be exposed to dioxins directly. Also smokers get down 
more dioxin than the average person (source: Lenntech).  
The average contribution to the daily amount of dioxin that ends up in the body is:  
- 27% by dairy products,  
- 23% by meat (products),  
- 16% by fish (products) and  
- 4% by eggs  
In Figure 2.2.2 it is shown from what products people’s dioxin exposure arises when eating a 
typical North-American diet.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Chart from EPA Dioxin Reassessment Summary 4/94 - Vol. 1, p. 37 
(Figure II-5. Background TEQ [dioxin Toxic Equivalent] exposures for North America by 
pathway) (source: Dioxin homepage) 
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Refined edible oils and fats and vegetable products contribute for 17% and 13% to the amount 
of dioxins and PCBs that end up in humans (Source: Voedingscentrum). 
It takes a long time for the body to secrete dioxin, because it reacts with body fats and 
subsequently accumulates in the body. Sometimes, it may take 7 to 11 years for dioxin to 
leave the body via the gall-bladder (source: Lenntech). 
 
Health aspects of dioxin 
The uptake of high concentrations of dioxin causes symptoms as chlorine acne. Usually this 
can be cured within several months (and in worst case within several years). Furthermore, 
dioxin has the reputation to damage the immune system and to decrease fertility.  
Children that have been exposed to dioxins before birth have symptoms like a low birth 
weight, a darker skin colour, eye membrane inflammation, alteration of the nails, and a 
delayed development.  
TCDD, or the Seveso-dioxin, is a human carcinogen in the long term. Chronic exposure can 
cause breast cancer and liver cancer (source: Lenntech). 
 
Control 
Food stuffs and animal feed products are checked for dioxins and PCBs in different manners. 
Measurements in food have demonstrated that the pollution in the Netherlands (and in 
Europe) has decreased considerably the last years. Also the concentration of dioxins and 
PCBs in Dutch breast milk decreases.   
In the Netherlands research institutes RIVM and RIKILT have carried out national measuring 
programmes in 1998 and 1999. From this it appeared that the estimated average dioxin toxic 
equivalent (TEQ) and dioxin-like PCBs is together about 1.2 picogram TEQ/kg body 
weight/day (about 0.65 picogram for dioxin only). Compared to results from the beginning of 
the nineties it appears that the intake of dioxin and PCBs is halved by now.  
The European Committee (EC) aims to force back the concentrations in food and animal feed 
via regulations and seeks to establish rules to track down possible pollution at an early stage. 
To force back the amount of dioxins measures aimed at the sources of pollution are most 
successful (Source: Voedingscentrum).  
 
In 1998, The World Health Organisation (WHO) determined the daily tolerated intake (TDI) 
on 1 to 4 picograms TEQ per day and per kilogram of body weight. 
A recent study of the German Environmental Agency proposes that the lower end of the 
WHO TDI should be used for all standard settings and risk reduction measures 
(http://dioxin2004.abstract-management.de/pdf/p363.pdf). 
From this it can be concluded that dioxin is of direct relevance for human food safety. 
 
 
2.1.5 International dimension 
 
The case has a clear international dimension. The contaminated clay, which originated the 
high concentrations of dioxin in food products, is imported from Germany. Next to it, the 
same contaminated clay is also exported from Germany to Belgium and France. Because 
eventually contaminated animal feed entered the market, immediate action was required. Alert 
notifications were sent to the European Commission by the countries involved. These alert 
notifications are categorised in the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF), which is 
a system that has been in used since 1979. The purpose of the RASFF is to provide the control 
and inspection authorities with an effective tool for exchange of information on measures 
taken to ensure food safety (source: European Commission). 
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Representatives of The Netherlands, Belgium, France and Germany were summoned to show 
up in Brussels. Both in Belgium and Germany several animal farms were closed because of 
the use of the contaminated feed (source: www.ping.be; www.omroepflevoland.nl). 
 
Packed meat is also exported from The Netherlands to other countries. Therefore the 
international dimension of this case could have been larger if contaminated meat would have 
been exported to other countries. In this particular case that has not happened since the 
emerging risk is detected at an early stage.  
 
Dioxin is found worldwide as a result of natural processes or as a result of industrial 
processing. Cases of food products contaminated with dioxins or exposure to high 
concentrations have also been registered in very different parts of the world as presented 
above. Also it has been found in food products which are often imported/exported. Therefore 
incidents with dioxin are very likely to have an international dimension. 
 
 
2.1.6 Political impact factor 
 
The political impact factor is mainly determined by the seriousness of the incident in terms of 
food safety. As this incident has a direct relation to human food safety, it had a high political 
impact factor.  
 
Besides, the political impact factor is for a large degree determined by the way the incident is 
reported, because this largely influences the public opinion and other stakeholder’s 
perception. The first reporting were the alert notifications of the involved countries to the 
European Union, which revealed the presence of dioxin in potato peels. As these potato peels 
were fed to milk cows and pigs, this implied that dioxin could be present in these animals and 
could end up in people after consuming milk or pork meat. The Dutch government decided to 
close down all milk and pork meat producing companies which had used these potato peels as 
animal feed (see press releases in appendix 3).  
 
Due to the fact that the contaminated potato peels had been fed to cows (during a period of 
maximal 3 months) preceding the detection of dioxin in the tank milk, some milk 
contaminated with a (very) low level of dioxin had reached the supermarket. VWA reported 
that milk with a very diluted amount of dioxin had ended up in the supermarket, but that this 
posed no harm to human health. However, there was also a risk that the dioxin could have 
adhered to the potatoes used for the French Fries production. It appeared that there was no 
dioxin present in fries according to measurements of the French Fries producing company.  
Because this incident posed no actual problem to human health the public impact factor was 
relatively low. 
 
Last but not least, the media has a prominent role in determining the political impact factor, as 
the media has a great influence on the public opinion. There has been substantial negative 
media coverage of this incident. However this media coverage concentrated not so much on 
food safety, but more on ‘naming and shaming’of the organisations deemed responsible for 
the occurrence of the risk. Especially the most affected food company, the certifying body, the 
PDV2 and the GMP+-regulation were heavily blamed. The negative media attention had 
partly to do with the fact that, according to the PDV,  people have a misconceived image of 
                                                 
2 Productschap Diervoeder (Dutch animal feed board) 
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the role of the PDV concerning the handing out of certifications. The fragmentary and divided 
reporting by the different concerned business parties also partially contributed to the negative 
media attention. The latter is a result from the fact that the concerned chain members (animal 
feed company – cattle farm – meat processor) often communicated via the media instead of 
directly with each other (Productschap Diervoeder 2004). 
 
 
2.1.7 Risk perception of relevant stakeholders 
 
In this incident the following relevant stakeholders can be mentioned: government, chain 
related associations as PDV and certifying bodies, industry, consumers, consumer 
organisations, environmental organisations and media. 
The government, chain related associations as PDV and certifying bodies and industry have 
early access to actual information and facts, which implies that their perception is in better 
correspondence with the actual risk situation.  
The information supply to consumers, consumer organisations and environmental 
organisations consists mainly of the reports of the media, as they have little access to 
specialist and factual information. As a result, the media reports determine to a large degree 
the perception that these stakeholders have of the risks of the incident.  
 
 
2.1.8 Re-emergence in the future  
 
Although further measures to reduce emissions of both dioxins and PCB’s into the 
environment have been taken and the concentrations in the diet are expected to continue to 
decrease (source: Dioxins in food), re-emergence of the risk is most probable for the 
following two reasons: 
 
1) Dioxin is present in the environment both naturally and as a waste product from industrial 
production (e.g. as by-product of the production of PCBs (poly chlorinated biphenyls), 
PCPs (poly chlorinated phenols) and of herbicides, metal working, paper industry, etc). 
Dioxin sources in nature already exist for centuries and they will still remain present for a 
long period. Therefore there are ample sources of dioxins. 
2) Dioxin is taken up in fat and breaks down quite slowly. Hence it accumulates in the body 
fat of humans and animals where it can remain for a long time. This also contributes to 
increase the chance of a re-emerging dioxin contamination in the future. 
 
 
2.1.9 Broader relevance of the case  
 
 Information on this case could be useful for the following type of risks:  
- All contaminations with dioxin or other similar toxins in different food products; 
- Contaminations through animal feed in general; 
- Emerging risks in the packed meat chain. 
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2.2 Pro-activity paying off and lacking pro-activity 
 
The above description of the case is in part based on interviews conducted with eight 
representatives of pork meat producing companies. In addition, representatives of the VWA 
(The Dutch Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority; responsible for the risk 
assessment) and Rikilt (The State Institute for Quality Control of Agricultural Products; 
responsible for the dioxin measurements) were also interviewed. They have participated in the 
crisis team which has co-ordinated the incident. Their knowledge of the case was also very 
useful to assess the pro-activity in this case. The answers to the following list of questions 
describe the pro-activity in place and the missed pro-activity in this incident.  
  
1) How is the emerging risk detected? Can the detection moment be considered early, late or 
in-between? 
 
The emerging risk was accidentally detected. The high concentrations of dioxin in the 
farm/tank milk (start point of the incident) were detected in a routine analysis within the 
national milk monitoring programme of the dairy industry.  
 
The sampling set up of the national milk monitoring programme is the following: 
- milk of 3 to 7 milk farms are collected by a milk collection truck/route; 
- per month there are 9000 milk collection trucks/routes (each with milk originating 
from 3 to 7 milk farms depending on the size of the farm); 
- 20 milk collection trucks/route are analysed per month; 
- 10 times per year a pooled milk sample of 4 milk collection truck/routes is analysed. 
Next to it, in the frame of a monitoring programme of the agricultural sector financed by the 
Ministery of Agriculture an extra set of 40 individual milk farms are analysed per year.  
  
Regarding the time span between detecting the risk and carrying out actions, some time delay 
occurred. This is due to the fact that dioxin analyses had to be carried out, which takes about 
three days. 
 
From the point of view of public health, the risk was detected early since the milk did not 
reach the consumers and was not even in the distribution chain. However from the perspective 
of someone expecting an early warning of an emerging risk, the detection was late because 
there were already some indicators/changes in the normal pattern.  If these would have been 
picked up on time, the potential risk would have been detected much earlier (see question 6). 
 
 
2) Which pro-active actions did play a role in the detection of the emerging risk? 
 
The detection occurred due to a routine analysis within the monitoring programme of the 
dairy industry itself; no further pro-active approaches existed. However from the moment that 
dioxin was found in milk till the closing of the pig farms a number of actions were taken to 
track down the source of the contamination and search for other potentially contaminated 
products. In this search process two actions have played an important role: 
- Identification of the type of dioxin by comparing the structure of the dioxin founded in 
the milk with other dioxins analysed before (data base). This made it possible to define 
that the dioxin should be originating from clay (the pattern was similar to the dioxin 
found in an incident with clay from Germany in 1998). The presence of this specific 
knowledge/expert analysis was important.  
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- Well trained and motivated personnel (inspectors) were able to find the link between 
the clay and the potato peels.     
 
3) Would a holistic approach (i.e. attend to indicators from outside the respective chain) 
benefit the detection of the emerging risk? Were any specific indicators from outside the 
chain missed? 
 
Yes, indicators from outside the chain could have anticipated the emergence of the risk and 
indeed they were missed. These indicators are presented in the answer to question 6.  
  
4) In case of an early detection of the emerging risk, what would the consequences be if the 
emerging risk would have been detected later (i.e. the early detection would have been 
missed)? 
 
In case the high concentration dioxin in the milk had not been detected it would have entered 
the distribution chain and would have been consumed. The amount of dioxin was not high 
enough to be considered a public health risk. However, if the risk was not detected, the use of 
contaminated clay and respective contaminated potato peels could have led to a systematic 
source of dioxin entering the human food chain.   
 
5) In case of a late detection of the emerging risk, which pro-active approaches could have 
increased the chance of detecting the emerging risk earlier? 
 
A better coordination of processes could have resulted in an even earlier detection of the risk, 
i.e. it could even have resulted in the anticipation of the risk. What kind of processes would be 
important is explained in detail here below.    
 
6) Would the detection of the emerging risk benefit from a better use of the indicators from 
outside the respective chain (holistic view)? 
 
The answer to this question is: yes. 
 
Complementary information on the background of the case  
The washing and sorting of potatoes in the potato processing industry used to be done with 
salt. However the use of salt is environment unfriendly and therefore the Dutch government 
issued a new law to forbid the use of salt. As a consequence of the new law the potato 
industry seeked for alternatives, and so is the use of clay to wash and sort potatoes was 
introduced in the process. These events occurred in the beginning of 2004. The potato 
industry started buying clay and so the contaminated clay ended up in the process. 
 
The following indicators from outside the chain can be used for an early detection of the 
emerging risk: 
- changes in processes in the food industry, in particular those that affect the waste 
streams of the process (these changes should also be introduced the HACCP plan of 
the respective company); 
- changes in legislation; in this case it is important to analyse and anticipate what the 
consequences of the new law will be for the different actors directly or indirectly 
affected by the new law; 
- monitor the changes in the amount of clay and other materials being traded; changes in 
the purchasing pattern of technical auxiliary substances;  
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- changes in market prices of materials, ingredients and technical auxiliary substances 
(because prices are often directly correlated with supply and demand of the respective 
material or substance). 
 
2.3 Conclusions and recommendations 
  
One of the most important conclusions of this emerging risk case is that the contamination 
with dioxin could have been expected and anticipated. Although the high concentrations 
dioxin were detected early enough in terms of public health, the possibility of a contamination 
could have been expected if the responsible authorities would have picked up the signals 
(indicators) arising from a change in legislation and subsequent change in production process. 
From these changes the incident ultimately originated. 
 
Furthermore, this emerging risk case is specifically a good example on how a holistic view, 
i.e. monitoring indicators from outside the respective chain can play an important rol in the 
early detection of possible risks. These indicators would be of high value in an early warning 
system: 
- changes in legislation; 
- changes in production process (due to new laws, but also due to technological 
developments, new more cost effective solutions, development and production of new 
products, etc); 
- changes in trade volumes and prices of materials, ingredients, etc deployed in the food 
industry.  
 
In the case of dioxin incidents, an early warning system would very much benefit from a 
worldwide overview of dioxin sources. The mapping of sources of dioxins is feasible because 
these sources remain intact for a long period of time.  
 
A general conclusion on the kind of indicators is that they are related to changes. Changes to 
the existing situations and patterns are important leads to possible risks.  
 
Considering the facts, actions and decisions taken in the course of the incident (crisis 
management) the following can be concluded and recommended:  
 
- The relevant potato processing companies involved did not recognise the risk of 
dioxin in marl clay in their risk assessment and have not introduced it in their HACCP 
plan. When the process was changed (the use of salt replaced with clay) this should 
have been introduced in the HACCP plan.     
- Communication between the different parties involved and the communication 
towards the media was not always optimal giving rise to wrong interpretations of the 
situation, inefficiency and misconceptions of the actual risk. Therefore a better 
communication strategy, based on providing transparent communication, is 
recommended. In particular towards the media, a spokesman should be appointed who 
is responsible for all communication to the media. 
- Not all available data was used, resulting for instance in closing more pig farms than 
what would have been necessary. On the other hand, the UBN database (registration 
number of animal farms in The Netherlands) was not updated and therefore the 
information was not complete or correct.  
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- After some complications regarding the data and intervention processing options were 
resolved, the recall of contaminated shipments was well organised and adequately 
managed. 
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3. The BSE crisis in Great Britain 
  
Thomas J. Hagenaars 
Quantitative Veterinary Epidemiology, Division of Infectious Diseases, Animal Sciences 
Group, Wageningen University and Research Center 
 
 
3.1 Case description 
In this case report I study in some detail the identification of the emerging BSE risks to cattle 
(1986) and to humans (1996) in Great Britain. The aim is to identify, with the benefit of 
hindsight, the scope for success that had existed for a more pro-active approach to lead to 
earlier identification of the risk and/or to better risk management. In this first section I briefly 
describe some basic aspects of the case. 
Detection of the risk to cattle in 1986 
In December 1986 pathologists at the Central Veterinary Laboratory (CVL) in Great Britain 
identified the possibility that cattle had developed a spongiform encephalopathy transmissible 
in the same way as scrapie in sheep. The head of the pathology department in a minute to 
colleagues wrote: “If the disease turned out to be bovine scrapie it would have severe 
repercussions to the export trade and possibly also for humans if for example it was 
discovered that humans with spongiform encephalopathies had close association with the 
cattle.” (BSE Inquiry, Vol. 3, 1.37). In December 1987 John Wilesmith (CVL) identified the 
use of Meat and Bone Meal (MBM) containing ruminant-derived tissue in feed for ruminants 
as the likely source of infection with the disease, by then named Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy (BSE).  
Detection of the risk to humans in 1996 
On 16 March 1996 Dr Robert Will of the Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease Surveillance Unit 
(CJDSU) in Great Britain reported the identification of a new variant of Creutzfeldt-Jakob 
Disease in an emergency meeting of the British Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory 
Committee (SEAC). SEAC concluded that same day that the possibility that BSE constituted 
the risk factor for this new disease “should be taken very seriously”.   
BSE and pro-active decision making 
The events taking place from the mid-1980s until early 1996 have been described and 
commented in detail in the report of the “BSE Inquiry” [1], conducted in the period 1998-
2000. Due to this detail and as a result of the impact of the BSE crisis, the subject of this case 
study forms essential material for the historical study of the possibilities of and requirements 
for pro-active management of emerging risks. Some of the lessons that can be learned from 
this crisis (discussed below) should apply to a broad spectrum of possible emerging risks. 
In 1986/1987 it became clear that a completely new hazard to cattle had emerged in the form 
of BSE. From that moment it was also clear that BSE presented a possible risk to humans. In 
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the Executive Summary of the Report of the Inquiry, chapter 4, the following conclusions are 
formulated on MAFF’s assessment of the risk posed by BSE to humans:  
“One of the most significant features of BSE and other TSEs is the fact that they are diseases 
with very long incubation periods. Thus the question whether BSE was transmissible to 
humans was unlikely to be answered with any certainty for many years, and scientific 
experiments were bound to take a long time. The Government had to deal with BSE against 
this background of uncertainty as to the transmissibility of the disease.”  
As a result of the belief, stimulated by the first risk assessment by the Southwood Working 
Party, that this possible risk to humans was ‘remote’, precautionary measures against human 
exposure were not introduced very swiftly, and initially often without good enforcement. The 
detection in 1996 by the CJDSU of the reality of human BSE risk was as timely as reasonably 
possible, and proved the wisdom of the pro-active measure in 1989 to start a targeted CJD 
surveillance programme. However, because the demonstration of the human BSE risk took 
place only in 1996 due to the long incubation period of new variant CJD (vCJD), it could not 
prevent the preceding many years of human exposure. That exposure could have only been 
reduced by a better management of the (at that time still) ‘possible’ risk.   
 
International dimension and political impact  
 
The international dimension of the BSE crisis in GB has been very important. The economic 
interests of the British cattle sector, partly depending on exports, were one of the reasons why 
there was a need to avoid disproportionate fears and risk-management demands by the public 
for a human risk that had been described as “remote” in an assessment by authoritative 
scientists. To this end, the agriculture ministry MAFF adopted and stuck to a reassuring risk 
communication strategy in which uncertainties were underplayed and in which changes in the 
likelihood, as perceived by experts, that BSE might be transmissible to humans were ignored 
[1,2]. In the report of the BSE inquiry it is suggested that this communication strategy has 
contributed to the shortcomings of the risk management by the British authorities in period of 
1987-1996, as this message was undermining the implementation and enforcement of 
precautionary measures. Furthermore, in [2] it is suggested that some useful options for 
precautionary measures were ignored because of a fear of undermining the official reassuring 
message of there being  “no risk to humans”. In addition, the reassuring risk communication 
contributed strongly to the loss, in 1996, of public confidence in the ability of the British 
government to protect food safety, which lends the BSE crisis a very big political impact 
factor.  
 
Risk perception of the consumer 
 
BSE is an example of a ‘dread risk’: the consumer feels he cannot control his own exposure to 
the hazard, whilst the consequences of exposure may be horrific and fatal. Also, the risk is 
new and thus the consumer is unfamiliar with it. As a result, the BSE risk is likely to be 
perceived by the consumer as more important than one would expect on the basis of simply 
comparing the risk probability to that of other deadly risks. [Here I must note however that in 
the early years of the vCJD epidemic there was no scientific basis yet for objectively 
calculating a useful risk probability, as at that time it was not yet possible to estimate the level 
of human susceptibility (“species barrier”) with any useful precision [3]]. Loss of trust in the 
authorities responsible for risk management after these have had to retract a reassuring stance 
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in their risk communication (“No risk to humans”, “There is no BSE in German cattle”, “I 
don’t have any reason to think that this (3rd Dutch BSE case) is more than an incident” [4]) 
may further add to a ‘disproportionality’ of consumer’s worries about the BSE/vCJD risk.  
 
Re-emergence 
 
In ever more new countries BSE is being detected for the first time. In many cases such a 
detection follows a period of time in which the relevant national policy makers have argued 
that their country does not have or can not have a BSE problem, and in which sometimes the 
risk has been insufficiently managed. This once again proves that ‘learning from the past’ 
often is difficult. 
 
 
3.2 Pro-activity paying off and lacking pro-activity 
 
3.2.1 The discovery of the emerging risk in 1986 (cattle)  
 
Early to intermediate detection 
The emerging risk to cattle was detected in 1986/1987 in two steps, as described in de 
paragraph 2.3.1: first the new disease was found, and subsequently the likely risk factor 
(feeding of MBM) was identified. Was the detection of the new disease in cattle a timely 
detection? For answering this question the following passages from the report of the BSE 
Inquiry are relevant: 
•  “Individual cattle were probably first infected by BSE in the 1970s. If some lived long 
enough to develop signs of disease, these were not reported to or subject to investigation 
by the Central Veterinary Laboratory (CVL) of the State Veterinary Service (SVS).  
• The Pathology Department of the CVL first investigated the death of a cow that had 
succumbed to BSE in September 1985, but the nature of the disease that had caused its 
death was masked by other factors and was not recognised at the time. This is not a matter 
for criticism.  
• The Pathology Department considered two further cases of BSE at the end of 1986 and 
identified these as being likely to be a Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (TSE) 
in cattle. This identification was commendable.  
• This part of the story demonstrates both the benefits and the limitations of the passive 
surveillance system operated by the SVS.” 
 [From the “Executive Summary of the Report of the Inquiry, 2. The identification of the 
emergence of BSE”] 
As the new disease was spreading in the cattle population in a self-propagating fashion, such 
that there was an exponential increase in the prevalence of infection, detection of the disease 
was bound to happen at some point in time. Based on the judgement from the BSE Inquiry 
report, I may conclude that there has been no unnecessary delay in the detection. The passive 
surveillance system in place served its purpose, but certainly had its limitations, which made a 
very early detection of the new disease unlikely. The passive surveillance system in place was 
designed in the following way. Veterinary practitioners could call in help from a regional 
Veterinary Investigation Center (VIC). The VICs were part of the State Veterinary Service 
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(SVS, part of the agriculture ministry MAFF) and were closely linked to the pathology 
department of the Central Veterinary Laboratory (CVL), itself also part of the SVS. This 
system is a form of passive surveillance as it is not actively looking for possibly new diseases, 
but only awaiting the notifications, questions and/or materials for diagnosis that arrive at the 
VICs.  The timeliness with which a new disease is detected in such a system is limited by the 
following factors (BSE Inquiry report, paragraph 1.45):  
• The level of vigilance and inquisitiveness will differ between individual farmers   
• The level of vigilance and inquisitiveness will differ between individual vets 
• Submission of cases and samples by the veterinary practitioner is on a voluntary basis, and 
is partly a commercial decision 
• Not all veterinary practices use the services offered by the VIC; alternatives exist in the 
form of private labs and in-house facilities 
Analysis of the relevant samples collected in the years before BSE was detected produced 
only one BSE-positive case. This shows that on the basis of the material gathered in the 
passive surveillance system, earlier detection of the new disease in cattle could hardly have 
been possible. Therefore, the only real potential for improving on the timeliness of detection 
is in an improved design of the passive surveillance system, such that its ability of early 
detection would suffer less from the factors mentioned above. 
Was the identification of the cause of BSE in cattle (hazard or risk factor identification) a 
timely identification? The BSE Inquiry report concludes the following: 
•  “Gathering of data about the extent of the spread of BSE was impeded in the first half of 
1987 by an embargo within the SVS on making information about the new disease public. 
This should not have occurred.  
• By the end of 1987 Mr John Wilesmith, the Head of the CVL Epidemiology Department, 
had concluded that the cause of the reported cases of BSE was the consumption of meat 
and bone meal (MBM), which was made from animal carcasses and incorporated in cattle 
feed. This conclusion was correct. It had been reached with commendable speed.  
• The following provisional conclusions of Mr Wilesmith, which were generally accepted at 
the time as a basis for action, were reasonable but fallacious:  
o the cases identified between 1986 and 1988 were index (ie, first generation) cases 
of BSE;  
o the source of infection in the MBM was tissues derived from sheep infected with 
conventional scrapie;  
o the MBM had become infectious because rendering methods which had previously 
inactivated the conventional scrapie agent had been changed. 
• The cases of BSE identified between 1986 and 1988 were not index cases, nor were they 
the result of the transmission of scrapie. They were the consequences of recycling of cattle 
infected with BSE itself. The BSE agent was spread in MBM.  
• BSE probably originated from a novel source early in the 1970s, possibly a cow or other 
animal that developed disease as a consequence of a gene mutation. The origin of the 
disease will probably never be known with certainty.  
• The theory that BSE resulted from changes in rendering methods has no validity. 
Rendering methods have never been capable of completely inactivating TSEs.”  
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[From the “Executive Summary of the Report of the Inquiry, 3. The cause of BSE”]  
I note that the Report’s conclusion that BSE could not have resulted from changes in 
rendering methods is flawed, as will be explained in paragraph 2.3.3 below. I do agree with 
the conclusion that the identification of the consumption of MBM as the transmission route of 
BSE was a commendably speedy identification.  Therefore, with hindsight, only the presence 
of a surveillance system suffering less from the limitations mentioned above could have 
shortened the time spanned by the overall process of risk detection and identification of BSE.  
Surveillance approach and potential for earlier identification of the actual hazard 
In paragraph 1.46 of the BSE Inquiry report we read: 
“While we have not found any shortcoming on the part of MAFF in identifying the emergence 
of BSE, we accept the evidence of Mr Sibley of the BCVA as to the natural limitations of the 
passive surveillance system.” 
The BSE Inquiry report gives the following general recommendations for surveillance 
policies (BSE Inquiry report, paragraph 1.48):  
“If surveillance is to be effective, it is vital that: 
• any new disease in animals should be identified as soon as possible;  
• once identified, that the potential implications for human health of the disease, having 
regard to all potential routes of transmission, are considered by scientists with appropriate 
qualifications; and where potential risk is identified, appropriate measures are taken to 
address that risk.”  
Regarding the identification of BSE, the Inquiry report comments on the lessons to be learned 
as follows [Vol. 1, Chapter 14, commentary 1267]: 
• “An effective system of animal disease surveillance is a prerequisite to the effective 
control of animal diseases.  
• An effective system of passive surveillance will depend upon farmers and their 
veterinarians having the incentive and the facility for drawing instances of animal disease 
to the attention of the SVS.  
• Research into methods of diagnosis should form an integral part of an animal disease 
surveillance system.  
• The proximity of the nearest veterinary centre of investigation to the farm where the 
disease occurs will be an important factor in determining whether or not a casualty is 
referred for pathological examination.  
• The identification of BSE demonstrated the importance of the animal disease surveillance 
system of the SVS and of the close links that existed between the Veterinary Investigation 
Centres (VICs) and the Central Veterinary Laboratory (CVL).  
• It is important that details of a new disease which may have implications for human and 
animal health should be disseminated within the State and private veterinary systems in 
order to encourage the reporting of similar cases.” 
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In 2003 the 10-year UK Veterinary Surveillance Strategy [5] was launched, describing how 
the  Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) plans to work in partnership 
with others to provide earlier warning and more rapid detection of disease threats facing the 
UK.  
We note that the Inquiry’s recommendations for surveillance policies cited above do not touch 
upon the issue of cost-effectiveness. Clearly, the most effective potential surveillance strategy 
might also be the most expensive, and decision makers will need to take the limitations of 
financial resources into account. Another issue of importance is quality control. Evaluation of 
the quality of a surveillance strategy should be carried out on a regular basis. In this context, 
the number of reported suspect cases (say in a certain region) can serve as a readily available 
performance indicator.   
 
 
3.2.2 The possibilities for pro-active identification of a possible risk to cattle 
 
Could a more pro-active approach to food safety, e.g. using indicators outside the chain, have 
made it possible to identify a possible TSE risk to cattle much before 1986? 
 
In the early seventies of the last century, the hypothetical possibility that feeding animal tissue 
infected with a TSE to animals (of the same or of a different species) could transmit the TSE 
was widely known in the scientific community. Carlton Gajdusek received the Nobel prize for 
his work on kuru (a human TSE transmitted through cannibalistic rites in the Fore tribe in 
Papua New Guinea) and in his Nobel lecture [6] he remarks: “(…) the virus of natural mink 
encephalopathy, which, presumably, had its origin in the feeding of scrapie sheep carcasses to 
mink on commercial mink farms.” From this it does not immediately follow that the feeding 
of MBM would constitute a theoretical risk of transmitting a scrapie-like TSE, as for reaching 
that conclusion one would have to assume a very strong heat resistance of the agent.  
On the one hand, MBM had been used for many years in cattle feed throughout the world 
apparently without causing any TSE problem in cattle.  On the other hand, in Iceland the 
feeding of meat and bone meal to ruminants was reportedly subject to a voluntary ban coming 
into force in 1978, reportedly [7] to avoid the risk of cannibalism suggested by the possible 
link between scrapie en transmissible mink encephalopathy. From an EU assessment of BSE 
risks in Iceland [8] I cite: “According to Iceland, there is a “verbal agreement” not to use 
MBM in ruminant feed since 1978. However, no regulation was issued and no compliance 
data were provided.” 
The conclusion in the BSE Inquiry report that “the theory that BSE resulted from changes in 
rendering methods has no validity as rendering methods have never been capable of 
completely inactivating TSEs” ([1], Executive Summary, Chapter 3) is flawed, because a 
reduction in the degree of inactivation can make the difference between a “stable system” in 
which each case of BSE infection on average produces less than one offspring case and an 
“instable system” in which the infection will propagate epidemically [9]. A change in the 
British rendering process in the late seventies (a phasing out of the use of solvents to extract 
fat from greaves) was followed by a transition in 1982 to a nutritionally improved formula for 
cattle feedstuffs enhancing the inclusion of MBM concentrations ([1], Volume 13, Chapter 7, 
paragraph 28-30). At least the second change is likely to have contributed to the instability of 
the animal protein recycling system for spread of BSE.  
Had a more pro-active approach to food safety, using changes in production processes as 
indicators of a potential for newly emerging risks, been in place in Great Britain say from 
1975 onwards, would it have triggered precautionary action after the change in the rendering 
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process in the late seventies or in the feedstuff formula in 1982? Yes, it may be speculated 
that, given the results of studies in the late 1970s on the decontamination of scrapie strains by 
rendering at different temperatures, such a pro-active approach would have led to 
recommendations for monitoring scrapie prevalence in sheep. It is highly unlikely however 
that this would have led to a recommendation for the surveillance of cattle for a new TSE. 
Furthermore, a monitoring of sheep for changes in scrapie prevalence, as no clear changes 
would have occurred, would have not been of any help for earlier detection of BSE in cattle.  
Some scope for more pro-activity is present in the passive surveillance system in place in GB 
in the 1980s. A system with more positive incentives for veterinarians to submit material of 
diseased animals and with fewer negative incentives (financial and time costs), in which 
private-lab results are shared with the SVS, could have made the surveillance system more 
powerful in picking up new diseases.  More information and materials reaching the SVS 
would have perhaps made it possible to identify BSE in cattle about 1 year earlier. Whether 
the potential gains of a more powerful surveillance system justify the extra costs is an 
important issue, such that a costs-effectiveness analysis needs to inform decision making.  
 
3.2.3 The discovery of the emerging risk in 1996 (humans)  
Early detection 
In the “Executive Summary of the Report of the Inquiry” one of the main conclusions reads: 
“Cases of a new variant of CJD (vCJD) were identified by the CJD Surveillance Unit and the 
conclusion that they were probably linked to BSE was reached as early as was reasonably 
possible”, and I agree with this conclusion. The early detection of vCJD had been made 
possible by the pro-active recommendation in 1989 of the Southwood Working Party, the 
scientific committee advising the British government on the management of BSE risk, to set 
up surveillance for CJD (The subsequent Tyrrell Committee Report recommended the setup of 
a specialized unit).  
In [1] (Executive Summary, Chapter 13) this is described as follows: 
“The Southwood Working Party noted that if BSE were to be transmitted to humans it would 
be likely to resemble CJD and suggested that surveillance be put in place to identify atypical 
cases or changing patterns of the disease.  
• The task of detecting any variation in the characteristics of cases of CJD which might 
indicate infection with BSE was entrusted to the CJD Surveillance Unit (CJDSU), a 
research team of dedicated medical scientists headed by Dr Robert Will, a neurologist 
with extensive experience of CJD.  
• No role in this was given to the Public Health Laboratory Service (PHLS), an established 
service for the surveillance of new and existing disease, among other things.  
• The decision to establish a new team specifically for this purpose was vindicated by the 
prompt detection of the emergence of vCJD by the CJDSU.” 
On 16 March 1996 the conclusion was reached by the Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory 
Committee (SEAC) that the most likely explanation for the cases of a new variant of CJD in 
young people was exposure to BSE. The arguments behind the conclusion that the CJDSU 
had been prompt in its detection of vCJD are given in Volume 8, Section 5 of the Inquiry 
report: 
”5.160 The worst fears of officials and advisors were realised when, on 8 March 1996, the 
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CJDSU reported to SEAC that they were of the opinion that cases in ten young people could 
be a new form of CJD. The circumstantial evidence of a link with BSE led to the public 
announcement on 20 March 1996.” 
“5.169 We believe that the presentation to SEAC on 8 March 1996 could not have been made 
sooner. It was necessary to establish the clinical and pathological characteristics of the 
condition in a sufficient number of patients to justify the conclusion that a new variant of CJD 
had been identified. The findings had to be checked by independent scientists and clinicians, 
and it had to be shown that what appeared to be a new variant was not in fact a type of CJD 
previously reported in young people, either in the UK or abroad, before the BSE epidemic. 
Furthermore, the DNA of each patient had to be analysed to exclude a disease-producing 
mutation of the prion gene. These were all prerequisites to the conclusion that there was a new 
variant of CJD which was probably linked with BSE. The time taken to establish a link with 
BSE does not warrant criticism. A wrong conclusion, hastily drawn, could have created 
unwarranted public anxiety and could have been very damaging to public confidence.” 
Contingency planning and the potential for managing the detected risk more promptly 
 
In contrast to the pro-active mindset of the Southwood Working Party apparent in 
recommending CJD surveillance, the approach of the responsible civil servants in MAFF in 
1996 lacked pro-active thinking:  
• “It should have been apparent to both MAFF and DH by early February 1996 at the latest 
that there was a serious possibility that the scientists would conclude that it was likely that 
BSE had been transmitted to humans. The two Departments should have worked together, 
in consultation with SEAC, to explore the possible policy options that would be available 
should this occur.  
• There was no interdepartmental discussion or consideration of policy options within either 
Department until the middle of March 1996. The views of SEAC were awaited, both as to 
whether the cases of vCJD were linked with BSE, and as to what action should be taken if 
they were. This was an inadequate response.” [1] (Executive Summary, Chapter 13). 
This leads the Inquiry committee to formulate the following “lessons from the final months” 
in Volume 1, Chapter 14, Commentary 1279:     
“The Government was taken by surprise and wrong-footed by the announcement by SEAC 
that a new variant of CJD had been identified which was probably linked to BSE. It should 
not have been. The growing apprehension that this might be the case had been expressed by 
Dr Will and other members of SEAC at its meetings on 5 January 1996 and, more forcibly, 1 
February. Representatives of MAFF and DH present at those meetings did not put their 
colleagues on the alert that SEAC might be moving towards this conclusion. The possibility 
of this should nonetheless have been appreciated by those who received the reports of the 
SEAC meetings. They did not, however, consider any contingency plans. There were no 
interdepartmental discussions about the gathering storm. Everyone waited to see what SEAC 
had to say.” 
 
3.2.4 Successes and failures in the pro-active identification and management of a possible risk 
to humans  
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Although it is in part due to pro-active BSE policy making that the reality of the risk to 
humans was detected as early as reasonably possible, there were clearly important 
shortcomings in pro-active policy making after the identification, in the late 1980s, of a 
possible risk to humans. 
Also in view of the many years of human exposure that necessarily (due to the long 
incubation time of vCJD) occurred before the possible risk became a proven one, the 
following two issues seem of equal importance to the early detection of vCJD: 
• Early identification of the possible human risk.  
• Adequate precautionary policy making in the face of this possible risk. 
 
As far as the first point is concerned, I note that within MAFF the hypothetical issue of a risk 
to humans was identified immediately after the discovery of BSE, as is apparent from 
paragraph 2.3.1 above. I.e., from a point of view of pro-active signalling of possible risks to 
humans, no unnecessary delay occurred beyond any delay in detecting the risk to cattle. 
However, the management of the possible human risk was compromised by three main things: 
• Serious shortcomings of the initial risk assessment report produced by the Southwood 
Working Party, leading MAFF officials to believe that the risk to humans was ‘remote’.  
• MAFF’s subsequent decision to focus on reassurance in their risk communication to the 
public. 
• The absence of a coordinated or comprehensive consideration given to the various routes 
by which BSE might infect human beings or other animals. 
In the Executive Summary of the Report of the Inquiry, Chapter 4, the following conclusions 
are formulated on MAFF’s assessment of the risk posed by BSE to humans:  
• “MAFF officials appreciated from the outset the possibility that BSE might have 
implications for human health.  
• By the end of 1987 MAFF officials had become concerned as to whether it was acceptable 
for cattle showing signs of BSE to be slaughtered for human consumption. However, the 
Department of Health (DH) was not asked to collaborate with MAFF in considering the 
implications that BSE had for human health. It should have been.  
• Only in March 1988, by which time MAFF officials had advised their Minister that 
animals showing signs of BSE should be destroyed and compensation paid, did MAFF 
advise the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) Sir Donald Acheson of the emergence of BSE 
and ask him for his view of the possible human health implications.  
• On Sir Donald's advice, an expert working party, chaired by Sir Richard Southwood, was 
set up to advise on the implications of BSE. After their first meeting in June 1988, the 
Southwood Working Party advised that cattle showing signs of BSE should be slaughtered 
and destroyed. This advice was of crucial importance in safeguarding human health. The 
Working Party had concerns about some occupational health risks in relation to BSE and 
some risks posed by medicinal products. They notified the responsible authorities of these 
concerns. On 9 February 1989 they submitted a Report to the Government in the 
knowledge that it would be published. The report concluded that the risk of transmission 
of BSE to humans appeared remote and that 'it was most unlikely that BSE would have 
any implications for human health'.  
• This assessment of risk was made on the following basis:  
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- BSE was probably derived from scrapie and could be expected to behave like scrapie. 
Scrapie had not been transmitted to humans in over 200 years and so BSE was not likely 
to transmit either.  
- So far as occupational and medicinal risks were concerned, the authorities which had 
been notified about these could be relied upon to take appropriate measures to address 
them.  
• The Report did not, as it should have done, make clear the basis for its assessment of risk. 
It did comment that if the assessment was incorrect the implications would be extremely 
serious. This warning was lost from sight. The Southwood Report was, in years to come, 
repeatedly cited as constituting a scientific appraisal that the risks posed by BSE to 
humans were remote and that no precautionary measures were needed other than those 
recommended by the Working Party.  
• Precautionary measures were nonetheless put in place that went beyond those 
recommended by the Working Party. The wisdom of those measures was demonstrated as 
the years went by and facts were learned about BSE which threw doubt on the theory both 
that it was derived from scrapie and that it would behave like scrapie.  
• In May 1990 a domestic cat was diagnosed as suffering from a 'scrapie-like' spongiform 
encephalopathy. This generated widespread public and media concern that BSE had been 
transmitted to the cat and might also be transmissible to humans. Subsequently, more 
domestic cats were similarly diagnosed. These events shifted the perception of some 
scientists of the likelihood that BSE might be transmissible to humans. By 1994 the 
Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC) evaluated the risk of 
transmissibility to humans as remote only because precautionary measures had been put in 
place.”   
With respect to the measures to address the food risks posed by BSE to humans, chapter 7 of 
the Executive Summary of the Report of the Inquiry makes the following remarks: 
• “The Southwood Working Party considered that all reasonably practicable precautions 
should be taken to reduce the risks that would exist should BSE prove to be transmissible 
to humans. However, they did not make this plain in their Report and did not recommend 
that the possible risks from eating animals incubating BSE but not yet showing signs of 
the disease ('subclinical cases') called for any precautions, other than a recommendation 
that manufacturers should not include ruminant offal and thymus in baby food. This was a 
shortcoming in their Report.  
• Because of a failure to subject the Southwood Report to an adequate review, MAFF and 
DH failed to identify this shortcoming. Concern about the food risks posed by subclinical 
cases was, however, expressed by some scientists, by the media and by the public. With 
the agreement of DH, MAFF reacted by announcing in June 1989 that those categories of 
offal of cattle most likely to be infectious (SBO) were to be banned from use in human 
food. The introduction of this vital precautionary measure was commendable. However, 
this ban was presented to the public in terms that underplayed its importance as a public 
health measure.  
• Careful consideration was given by MAFF and DH in 1989 to the terms of the human 
SBO ban, with one important exception. During the consultation process, concerns were 
raised about the practicality of ensuring the removal of all of the spinal cord during 
abattoir processes, and about the practice of mechanical recovery of scraps left attached to 
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the vertebral column for use in human food ('mechanically recovered meat' or MRM). 
However, MAFF officials discounted these concerns without subjecting them to rigorous 
consideration - in particular no advice was sought as to the minimum quantity of spinal 
cord that might transmit the disease in food.  
• MAFF gave detailed consideration to spinal cord and MRM in 1990. A lengthy paper was 
submitted to SEAC, the Government's new expert advisory committee on TSEs. 
Unhappily, as a result of a breakdown of communications, MAFF officials understood 
that the members of SEAC were not concerned about the inclusion in human food of an 
occasional scrap of spinal cord, so that no action was called for. In fact the advice of 
some, at least, of the members of SEAC was premised on the false assumption that spinal 
cord could readily be removed from the carcass in its entirety, and would be so removed.  
• This was one of a number of occasions that has given rise to lessons for the future about 
the proper use of expert committees by the Government.” 
With respect to risks to humans posed by other pathways of BSE infection, Chapter 11 of the 
Executive Summary of the Report of the Inquiry makes the following remark: 
“There was a need to establish all the pathways by which bovine products or by-products 
might come into contact with humans or other animals. This need was recognised by MAFF 
officials at an early stage and also by the Government's expert advisers on BSE. However, the 
exercise was never carried out prior to March 1996. As a result, no coordinated or 
comprehensive consideration was given to the various routes by which BSE might infect 
human beings or other animals.”   
Volume 1, Chapter 14 of Report of the Inquiry lists the lessons to be learned from the 
emergence of vCJD:  
• “Although likelihood of a risk to human life may appear remote, where there is 
uncertainty all reasonably practicable precautions should be taken.  
• Precautionary measures should be strictly enforced even if the risk that they address 
appears to be remote.  
• All pathways by which vCJD may be transmitted between humans must be identified and 
all reasonably practicable measures taken to block them.”  
With regard to the second lesson above, the BSE Inquiry Report suggests (Vol. 1, Chapter 6) 
that the quality of implementation and enforcement of the human SBO ban of 1989 must have 
been negatively influenced by MAFF’s reassuring risk communication that accompanied it. 
The ban was presented as a practical means to provide even more reassurance to the public in 
making sure that the Southwood Report’s recommendation on baby food, currently fulfilled, 
would remain fulfilled in the future. The baby food recommendation in itself was described 
by Southwood to MAFF representatives as a matter of “extreme prudence” ([1], Vol. 6, 3.30; 
and [2]). The government’s risk communication was embodied in the following part of a joint 
news release on 13 June 1989 by MAFF and the Department of Health announced the 
intention to introduce an SBO ban to cover all human food, which quoted the answer of the 
Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food to a written Parliamentary Question by Mr Tim 
Boswell, MP ([1], Vol. 6, 3.256): 
“The Government has already taken wide ranging action to deal with this new disease 
problem and has acted on all the recommendations made by the Southwood Working Party 
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which was set up to look at all aspects of the disease, including any human health 
implications. 
Although the Southwood Working Party regarded the risk to humans as remote, the 
Government acted on their recommendation that, as a precautionary measure, all cattle 
suspected as having BSE should be slaughtered and destroyed to take them out of the food 
chain. 
As a matter of extreme prudence, the Southwood Working Party also suggested that certain 
offals should not be used in the manufacture of baby foods. We established in February that 
these offals are not in fact currently used by baby food manufacturers. In order to provide 
even more reassurance to the public, I indicated then that we would bring forward regulations 
to ensure that there is no possibility of their use in the future. 
In working out the details, I have concluded that a better way of dealing with this would be to 
ensure that the relevant types of bovine offals should be rejected at slaughterhouses for all 
cattle so that they cannot be used for human consumption in any way. (…) This approach also 
deals with a separate problem, namely ensuring that if there is any risk that there are cattle 
incubating the disease but not showing clinical symptoms which are not being slaughtered and 
destroyed, their offals do not enter the food chain either.” 
Thus MAFF underplayed the public health relevance of taking out the offals from 
subclinically infected animals and gave the impression that the ban was not really a necessary 
precautionary measure. In the Inquiry Report, Vol. 1, Chapter 6, the presentation is 
commented as follows: 
“568 This at least referred to the subclinical animals, but in terms that suggested that there 
was no more than a risk that some of these might go for slaughter. In fact this was inevitably 
happening on a substantial scale.” 
“569 How far the presentation, which played down the importance of the human SBO ban, 
influenced people's attitudes we shall never know. We had evidence from many sources, 
however, of a perception that the ban was not really necessary as a public health measure.” 
In part this misrepresentation might have been caused by the wish not to endanger the 
authority of the Southwood Working Party, in part it might have been caused by the fear that 
when admitting the true rationale of the policy, public opinion might ‘overreact’ and pressure 
would rise to take further, but truly unnecessary, precautionary measures.  
 
 
3.3 Conclusions and recommendations 
 
The main conclusions of this case study and their implications for pro-active approaches to 
the identification of emerging risks are as follows. 
• Surveillance structures in place in Great Britain have been successful in achieving an early 
(human risk in 1996 and risk to cattle in 1986) detection of emerging BSE risks. 
• With regard to the BSE risk to cattle I conclude: 
o A more pro-active approach to risk identification could perhaps have yielded a 
benefit. The passive surveillance structure could have been (even) more powerful 
if farmers and veterinarians had been given more positive incentives to submit 
animal material to Veterinary Investigation Centers for diagnosis and/or a common 
database had been present, supplied by both the State Veterinary Service and 
veterinary practitioners.  
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o It may be speculated that in a pro-active approach in which changes in production 
processes are used as indicators of a potential for newly emerging risks, the 
identification of a possibly enhanced scrapie risk in sheep would have been 
triggered in the late 1970s or early 1980s by the changes in rendering processes 
and the subsequent enhancement in the amount of MBM included in ruminant 
feedstuffs. Subsequent monitoring of scrapie in sheep would however not have 
been useful for detecting BSE in cattle, and it seems unlikely that monitoring of 
cattle themselves would have been recommended. 
• With regard to the BSE risk to humans I conclude: 
o Precautionary actions against the human risk were compromised by several issues, 
including the shortcomings of a first risk assessment. 
 
I would like to make the following recommendations on pro-active policy making: 
• Assessments are needed of the likelihood of introducing new risks when changes are made 
in production processes (including feeding and housing of animals) 
• Proper investments in surveillance structures and specialist expertise are vital 
• Pro-actively signalling potentially emerging risks is only a first step. Swiftly introducing 
adequate precautionary risk management and appropriate risk communication may be as 
difficult or even more difficult, especially when the risk is not yet a proven risk or its 
magnitude and/or properties are subject to large uncertainty. 
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4.1 Case description 
 
Avian Influenza 
 
Avian Influenza is a viral disease of birds and is caused by influenza A viruses. Influenza A 
viruses that infect poultry can be subdivided into two groups: low pathogenicity (LPAI) and 
high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) viruses on the basis of severity of disease after 
experimental infection (Alexander, 2002). HPAI outbreaks in domestic poultry are limited to 
the subtypes H5 and H7 (Swayne and Suarez, 2000), although not all viruses of these 
subtypes will cause HPAI. On several other occasions in the past, e.g. in the USA (Bean et al., 
1985), Mexico (Garcia et al. 1996), Italy (Capua and Marangon, 2000), Chile (Rojas et al., 
2002), the Netherlands (Elbers et al., 2004) and Canada (Bowes et al., 2004) it has been 
shown that HPAI-virus strains developed from a LPAI-virus strain by means of mutations 
mostly involving insertions near to the cleavage site. Mutation of influenza viruses are 
assumed to occur randomly and are attributed to mistakes made by the polymerase needed for 
virus genome replication. Mutants will survive and emerge whenever they have a selective 
growth advantage over the majority of the virus population. A positive selective pressure only 
seems to exist in poultry. Therefore, the longer the presence and the larger the spread of LPAI 
H5 and H7 viruses in poultry the more likely HPAI virus will emerge (Alexander, 2003). 
Thus mutation being a stochastic event, combined with mutant selection, explains the 
variability in time before the emergence of HPAI from a LPAI virus.  
 
It is well known that waterfowl and shorebirds (wild and domesticated) are the major natural 
reservoir and source of all known influenza A viruses (Swayne and Halvorson, 2003). Wild 
bird surveillance studies performed in North America showed that in particular Anseriformes 
(like ducks and geese) and shorebirds are frequently carriers of influenza A viruses. Recently, 
surveillance studies in Europe confirmed the higher prevalence in ducks compared to other 
waterfowl but no viruses were isolated from shorebirds indicating regional differences (De 
Marco et al., 2003; Fouchier et al., 2003). Nearly all viruses isolated from wild birds are low 
pathogenic, and the few that were highly pathogenic could be associated with major outbreaks 
in domestic poultry. Only after low pathogenicity viruses of H5 and H7 subtype are 
introduced in poultry, in particular chickens and turkeys, high pathogenicity mutants come up 
after variable length of time (Alexander, 2003). In 19 of 24 outbreaks that were reported 
during the past 46 years evidence showed that the virus was introduced from wild fowl and 
then mutated either in a short period (15 cases) or after several months (4 cases) into a HPAI 
variant. 
 
HPAI outbreaks in the Netherlands 
HPAI outbreaks were first described in the Netherlands in poultry in 1924 in the 
municipalities Achterveld, Scherpenzeel and Woudenberg (situated in the same area that was 
struck during the 2003 epidemic). The last time HPAI was observed in the Netherlands was in 
1927 in the same area as in 1924 (van Heelsbergen, 1927). HPAI was never reported before 
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by the Netherlands to the Office International des Epizooties (OIE) in Paris. However, after 
an absence from the Netherlands for more than 75 years, a serious suspicion of an infection 
with HPAI virus on several poultry farms in the “Gelderse Vallei” was reported on 28 
February 2003 (Elbers et al., 2004). The “Gelderse Vallei” is an area in the central-eastern 
part of the Netherlands with a very high density of poultry and poultry farms. Consequently, 
the governmental authorities were informed. It was the start of a large HPAI epidemic with 
the H7N7 strain, in which especially the high-density poultry areas were severely hit.  
 
Re-emerging risk 
Strictly speaking the epidemic was due to a re-emerging risk, as it had happened before in the 
Netherlands. However, because of the time period of almost 75 years between disease events, 
it was felt by the poultry industry as if it was a new risk. There is a lot to say about this view, 
and this is discussed in section 2.4.2.  
 
Human health risk 
In the first days of the eradication campaign, a number of veterinary practitioners showed a 
conjunctivitis (an infection of the mucosal membrane of the eye) after having visited infected 
poultry farms (Koopmans et al., 2004). Conjunctivitis can be the result of virus replication in 
the mucosal membrane of the eye. Historically, at that time there was one publication known 
of a possible human infection by birds with the avian influenza H7N7-strain. In 1996 a H7N7 
virus was isolated in England from the eye of a 43-year-old woman with mild one-sided 
conjunctivitis who kept ducks (Kurtz et al., 1996). In 1979, several marine researchers 
developed conjunctivitis when examining stranded and dead harbor seals on Cape Cod in the 
USA. The disease in the seals was associated with an influenza virus that was antigenically 
similar to A/Fowl Plague/Dutch/27 (H7N7) (Webster et al., 1981). Furthermore, in Hong 
Kong a total of 18 people got infected and 6 people died after exposure to H5N1-infected 
poultry on live bird markets (Shortridge et al., 1998). During the second half of the 1990s 
outbreaks in poultry, due to H9N2 subtype, have been reported from several countries around 
the world. In March 1999 two independent isolations of AI virus of subtype H9N2 were made 
from girls aged one to four who recovered from flu-like illnesses in Hong Kong (Peiris et al., 
1999). Subsequently, 5 isolations of H9N2 virus from humans on mainland China in August 
1998 were reported. During the H7N1-epidemic in poultry in Italy in 1999-2000, no clinical 
signs were observed in people in close contact with infected poultry during the eradication 
campaign (Capua and Marangon, 2000). 
The risk assessment in the first days of the epidemic in the Netherlands therefore was that the 
human risk was small, but not zero. After more influenza-like symptoms were seen in 
veterinary practitioners and other people in close contact with infected poultry in the days 
after, and in addition a veterinarian was diagnosed with a human influenza H3N2-infection 
while working with infected poultry, an active case-finding operation was started and a 
stringent protocol was implemented (Koopmans et al., 2004). The protocol consisted of 
vaccination (against the human influenza H3N2 strain) of people working with infected 
poultry, prophylactic administration of antivirals and use of protective devices (glasses, 
clothing etc.). Retrospectively, one has to conclude that transmission of H7N7-virus occurred 
to a considerable number of people in direct contact with infected poultry, and there are 
indications for transmission from person-to-person in a few cases. Due to a very unfortunate 
course of events, a 57-year-old veterinary practitioner died on April 17th as the result of 
pneumonia followed by acute respiratory distress syndrome and related complications after 
infection with the HPAI subtype H7N7-virus (Fouchier et al., 2004). He visited a poultry 
flock with a possible suspicion of HPAI-infection on April 2nd in an area outside the 
protection and surveillance zones of the primary outbreak area, wearing protective devices, 
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but without receiving prophylactic treatment with antivirals. The stringent protocol was 
indicated for people working inside the protection and surveillance zones, because they were 
likely to be exposed for longer time periods to HPAI-virus. The clinical symptoms of the 
veterinary practitioner (fever and headache, but no conjunctivitis or respiratory disease) on 
April 4th were not associated with an HPAI-infection (Fouchier et al., 2004). Because of his 
farm visit on April 2nd, a throat and eye swabs were collected on April 9th, but RT-PCR tests 
performed in 2 laboratories were negative. After admission into a hospital, his clinical 
situation deteriorated and he died a few days later. Afterwards, the results of a 
bronchoalveolar lavage indicated that he died of an infection with AI virus (subtype H7N7). 
Because AI virus can be found in products from infected poultry like table eggs and meat 
products, the export of poultry products from the Netherlands was prohibited. 
 
Transmission to other countries 
After the international announcement of HPAI-outbreaks in the Netherlands, our 
neighbouring countries Belgium and Germany, took stringent precautions in order to prevent 
introduction into their country and measures were taken to detect a possible introduction into 
poultry as soon as possible: 
a) Crisis unit was put in state of high alert; b) Nation-wide ban on gathering of poultry and 
other birds; c) Nation wide transport ban of live poultry and hatching eggs; d) Stringent and 
nation-wide biosecurity measures on poultry holdings; e) Limited access to poultry holdings, 
especially for any person in contact with poultry in Netherlands; f) Increased vigilance with 
regard to poultry and egg transports at the Dutch-Belgian border; g) Notification of any 
disease or increased mortality for which HPAI could not be excluded; h) Prohibition of 
medical treatment of poultry unless samples have been sent to regional Animal Health 
Service; i) Tracing of all Belgian high-risk contact holdings (import of live birds or hatching 
eggs / indirect contact with infected Dutch premises); j) Establishment of protection and 
surveillance zones as a result of outbreaks in the Netherlands near the Belgian border. 
 
There was a first suspicion of an HPAI outbreak in Belgium on March 11th in a 12,000 broiler 
flock in the municipality of Ravels near Poppel (less than 0.5 km from the border with the 
Dutch province of Noord-Brabant). Suspicion was raised after 2,000 birds died on one single 
day. The poultry flock in Ravels was depopulated within 24 hours of the suspicion as a 
precautionary measure. Backyard poultry in an area within a one-kilometer radius of the 
suspect flock was depopulated and destroyed. On March 24th, the definite diagnostic test 
result for the suspicion in Ravels was negative. 
A second clinical suspicion of an AI-outbreak was raised on April 15th  in a 10,500 parent 
poultry stock in the municipality of Meeuwen-Gruitrode (less than 14 km from the border 
with the Dutch province of Limburg). Lab confirmation of infection came on April 18th: 
positive  for HPAI  subtype H7. 
Within a period of 2 weeks a total of 8 HPAI outbreaks occurred:  
- four more outbreaks in the area around first outbreak (in Bree and Kinrooi); 
- three other outbreaks 60 km west of the primary outbreak area (in Meer and Westmalle). 
In the period of April 16th to May 15th 2003, a total of 129 poultry flocks were depopulated, 
comprising a total of 3.2 million birds. It can be concluded that probably due to the high level 
of alertness in response to the AI-outbreaks in the Netherlands and a quick response 
(depopulation of infected flock and pre-emptive slaughter of neighborhood flocks), only a 
limited number of outbreaks occurred in Belgium.  
 
In Germany, there was a first suspicion of an AI outbreak on April 9th in a 32,000 broiler 
flock in Viersen (± 16 km from the Dutch Border, between Venlo and Mönchen-Gladbach). A 
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few days later, the lab confirmatory test indicated a negative result. A second suspicion of an 
AI-outbreak was raised in the evening on May 8th in a 30,000 broiler flock in Swalmtal (± 10 
km from Dutch Border, same area as the first suspicion). The flock was culled the next day as 
a precautionary measure, as were a few contact flocks (total 80,000 birds). Within a radius of 
3 km around the suspect flock, all poultry flocks were pre-emptively culled within 48 hours. 
On May 13th, the laboratory confirmation was positive for HPAI subtype H7. No further cases 
were reported since May 13th and restriction measures were lifted as of June 24th 2003. As in 
the case of Belgium, it can be concluded that probably due to the high level of alertness in 
response to the AI-outbreaks in the Netherlands and a quick response only one outbreak 
occurred in Germany.  
 
Political impact factor 
The recent CSF-, FMD and AI epidemics in the Netherlands, in which large numbers of 
animals were killed on infected premises, were covered intensively by the media. The general 
public was confronted with the killing of thousands of healthy (in the case of FMD: 
vaccinated) animals in the framework of pre-emptive culling to stop the epidemic. It was very 
difficult to convince the general public that these animals were killed because of trade 
circumstances and regulations. Furthermore, hobby farmers and children with one or two 
sheep, goats or chicken, lost there animals to pre-emptive culling, which resulted in a social 
outcry. With respect to AI there is even a much higher political impact due to the zoonotic 
aspects of AI. The human pandemic viruses of 1957 and 1968 appeared to have arisen by 
reassortment between viruses present in the human population and avian influenza viruses. 
Until 1996 there were only a very limited number of reported infections in humans exposed to 
AI. However, in recent years, a series of isolations from people having contact with poultry 
have been reported. The impact these subsequent human infections on public health issues 
was greatly enhanced by the high death rate in those shown to be infected. The main danger 
appears from the possibility that people infected with the AI viruses are simultaneously 
infected with a “human” influenza virus, in which case reassortment can occur with the 
potential emergence of a new virus fully capable of spread in the human population, resulting 
in a true influenza pandemic. The prospect of possibly ten thousands (and maybe millions) of 
human deaths during a future influenza pandemic is a huge fear factor, with tremendous 
political impact.   
    
Risk perception of relevant stakeholders 
The government and the commercial poultry industry are well aware of the risk of re-
emergence of AI. The 2003 epidemic in the Netherlands was a very costly event, both for 
industry and government. Almost 80% of the poultry production in the Netherlands is 
exported, implicating a heavy dependence on trade. After the epidemic the Dutch poultry 
industry indicated that it would not survive a future AI epidemic of a comparable size. There 
is a broad scientific consensus that wild waterfowl acts as the natural reservoir for LPAI 
viruses. Although not completely proven, there is also scientific consensus on the idea that AI 
is most probably introduced into commercial poultry by exposure to infected wild waterfowl 
and their excreta (EFSA, 2005). However, risk perception seems to be different for hobby 
farmers and farmers using alternative production systems. This is emphasized in the 
discussion around the temporary obligation of free-range poultry farmers to keep their poultry 
inside, due to the threat of introduction of HPAI virus of  subtype H5N1 from East Asia. The 
Society for Biological Poultry Farmers states that there is no evidence that migratory birds 
transmit (LP)AI viruses to commercial poultry (Borren, 2005). So, in their view there is no 
reason why their animals could not continue to use outdoor facilities without adjustments to 
their outdoor housing facilities preventing contact with wild waterfowl. Furthermore, they 
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state that not the outdoor-ranging but international transportation of poultry and the high 
number of contacts occurring between large commercial poultry farms are the factors causing a 
high risk for introduction of AI. This view is shared by the biological consumer organization 
“Stichting Wakker Dier” (Thieme, 2005).  
 
          
Is re-emergence of this risk likely to happen in the future? 
In the last 40 years of the 20th century, reports on severe HPAI outbreaks have, fortunately, 
been infrequent (Table 1). In the last 5 years, however, increased occurrence of HPAI is 
noticed, especially in South-East Asia, where it seems that the disease has become endemic 
and eradication has not be achieved so far. 
 
 Country Year Subtype  Country Year Subtype 
1 Scotland 1959 H5N1 15 Australia 1997 H7N4 
2 England 1963 H7N3 16 HongKong 1997 H5N1 
3 Canada 1966 H7N3 17 Italy 1997 H5N2 
4 Australia 1966 H7N7 18 Italy 1999-
2000 
H7N1 
5 Germany  1979 H7N7 19 Chile 2002 H7N3 
6 England 1979 H7N7 20 Netherlands/Belgium/ 
Germany 
2003 H7N7 
7 USA 1983 H5N2 21 South East Asia2 2004-
2005 
H5N1 
8 Ireland 1983 H5N8 22 Canada 2004 H7N3 
9 Australia 1985 H7N7 23 USA3 2004 H5N2 
10 England 1991 H5N1 24 South Africa 2004 H5N2 
11 Australia 1992 H7N3 25 Peoples Republic of 
North Korea 
2005 H7N? 
12 Australia 1994 H7N3 26 Kazakhstan 2005 H5N1 
13 Mexico 1994 H5N2 27 Russian Federation 2005 H5N1 
14 Pakistan 1994 H7N3     
Table 4.1 High pathogenicity avian influenza outbreaks in domestic poultry1 worldwide since 
1959. 
1  Where outbreak is wide spread and effecting more than 1 species, the isolate from the first 
outbreak identified is listed 
2 Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Republic of South Korea, 
Thailand and Vietnam reported disease in this period; the relationship of these viruses to 
A/Hong Kong/97 (H5N1) remains unclear at present. 
3 This virus did not kill chickens infected experimentally, but had multiple basic amino acids 
at the HA0 cleavage site. 
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The recent CSF- and FMD epidemics in the Netherlands, in which large number of animals 
were killed on infected premises and on pre-emptively culled farms, was covered intensively 
by the media and there was societal commotion in the lay public on the conventional 
production methods in the Dutch livestock industry. Besides, there was a social outcry on the 
killing of thousands of healthy (vaccinated) animals in the framework of pre-emptive culling 
to stop the epidemic. 
After these events, due to societal pressure, development of alternative production methods in 
the agricultural industry was promoted by the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature 
Management and Food Safety. Over the last 6 years, the number of free-range layer chickens 
and layer chickens produced in a biological production system in the Netherlands has 
increased two and three-fold, respectively (figure 1). 
According to the recent EFSA-report on Animal Health and welfare aspects of Avian 
Influenza (EFSA, 2005), the disease has escalated in the last years (in contrast to the 40 years 
before that), resulting in a global crisis with 50 million birds culled or dead in the EU alone 
between 2000 and 2003. Poultry holdings located under migratory flyways or in close 
proximity with wild bird breeding or resting sites are considered to have a greater risk of 
exposure to AI. This risk is thought to be enhanced in case of establishments with outdoor 
access and areas that have a high poultry density. Considering the future trend of more 
outdoor-production due to public demand and the observed higher rate of occurrence of AI in 
the EU and the rest of the world, it can be concluded that re-emergence of this risk is likely to 
happen in the future. The rate at which re-emergence may happen will, among others, depend 
on preventive measures (biosecurity, design of housing systems) taken in the Dutch poultry 
industry in the coming years.    
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 Figure 4.1. Development of the number of laying hens in free-range facilities and in 
biological production in the Netherlands 1999-2004 (source: Biologica/EKOmonitor and 
Product Board for Livestock, Meat and Eggs). 
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Detailed description of the detection of the emerging risk 
 
A detailed description of the detection of the first HPAI-infected poultry flocks was published 
by Elbers et al. (2004). Briefly, the first five cases were located in the “Gelderse Vallei”, an 
area in the central-eastern part of the Netherlands with a high density of poultry and poultry 
farms (± 4 poultry farms/km2). The premises of Case 1 (free-range layers) and Case 5 (parent-
stock broilers) were situated opposite to each other at the same road (± 500 meters distance) 
in the same municipality. The premises of Case 3 (free-range layers) were located at the same 
road as Case 1 and Case 5. Case 2 (caged layers) was situated in the same municipality as 
Case 3, the premises of Case 2 and Case 4 (free-range layers) were situated close to each 
other (± 600 meters distance). 
 
On Saturday 22 February, a decrease in feed and water intake in poultry of case 1 was seen. 
The day after (Sunday 23 February), there was continued decrease in feed and water intake, 
and start of increased mortality (1.5%). During the rest of the week 4 other flocks experienced 
severe clinical problems, expressed as high and extremely fast progressive mortality  (see 
figure 2 and 3) and severe diarrhea.  
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Figure 4.2. Development of mortality over time in the first four poultry flocks during the 
HPAI (subtype H7N7) epidemic in the Netherlands in 2003.  
 
 
None of the poultry farmers or veterinary practitioners notified the official veterinary 
authorities of a dramatic clinical situation. A few dead birds per flock were sent for post-
mortem examination (PME) to the Dutch Animal Health Service (AHS), a private veterinary 
laboratory. During PME, the majority of submitted birds showed peritonitis, in a few cases 
swollen liver, swollen spleen, slight tracheitis. Anamnesis (history taking) sent together with 
birds were in some cases of poor quality, there was no specific mention on extent of mortality 
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(reason for submission was often indicated as “increased mortality”). PME resulted in 
preliminary diagnosis: E. Coli or Salmonella gallinarum. During the week, supplementary 
laboratory investigations indicated: a) negative results trying to culture Salmonella or E.Coli; 
b) a test to exclude Newcastle Disease (ND) as cause of the slight tracheitis seen during PME 
was negative. On Friday 28 February, supplementary laboratory investigations of tissues from 
poultry submitted from case 1 and case 4 on S.gallinarum is still negative. In order to exclude 
other possible causes, the laboratory of the AHS started diagnostic tests on ND and AI in 
tissue samples from poultry submitted from case 1 and case 2. In addition, a veterinary 
poultry expert from the AHS was sent to both poultry flocks for clinical inspection. Report in 
the afternoon by telephone of the veterinary poultry expert describing a dramatic clinical 
situation in case 1 and case 2,  coincided with a positive test result for AI on tissue samples 
from case 1 and case 2. This resulted in a notification of a serious suspicion of AI to the 
veterinary authorities. 
 
 
Outbreak NL05/2003
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
February 2003
M
or
ta
lit
y 
in
 %
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Development of mortality over time in poultry flock nr. 5 during the HPAI 
(subtype H7N7) epidemic in the Netherlands in 2003.  
 
4.2 Pro-activity paying off and lacking pro-activity 
Which pro-active approaches contributed to detection of the AI-outbreak? 
The introduction of HPAI in commercial poultry flocks in the Netherlands was perceived by 
the industry as a new emerging risk (in contrast to a re-emerging risk for which one could 
have prepared oneself). In the end, final detection of the first AI-cases, several days after the 
start of an exponential increased mortality, benefited from the presence of veterinary 
specialists at the Animal Health Service. These specialists started a differential-diagnostic 
laboratory test to exclude or confirm AI after subsequent laboratory examination of samples 
from birds with disease problems in several poultry flocks in the “Gelderse Vallei” for several 
days failed to support a conclusive diagnosis.  
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However, detection could have been much earlier if veterinary practitioners and poultry 
farmers in the field had taken their responsibility by notifying the veterinary authorities of a 
very severe clinical situation. There was every reason to do that because the direct signs of a 
developing emergency were loud and clear by means of an exponentially increasing mortality 
in the poultry flocks that could not be denied. 
 
  
Did detection benefit from a holistic approach? 
There are no indications at all that detection of the first AI-outbreaks in the Netherlands in 
2003 benefited from a holistic approach by signals from indicators outside the chain. 
 
 
Could detection have profited from a more holistic approach? 
One could say indirectly, and on a more general level. It is clear that alternative production 
methods have been promoted by government, and as a result there has been a considerable 
increase in the number free-range poultry. The increase in outdoor production could have 
been used as a signal in a holistic approach to warn for an emerging risk, but it was not used. 
Retrospectively, as a response to the increase in free-range and biological poultry production, 
specific monitoring programs could have been created for these poultry flocks with a higher 
risk of AI-introduction. Although there have been many warnings from the scientific 
community in the past years that these alternative production methods constitute a higher risk 
of exposure to e.g. chemical contaminants and disease agents (parasites, bacteria and viruses) 
through contact with wild fauna and their excretion products, there was a primary focus on 
creating a market for biological products and getting retailers interested in selling these 
products to consumers. One can conclude that in the past years (and more or less even now) it 
was “politically incorrect” to ask attention for the risks involved with these production 
methods.  
 
 
If detection was late, which pro-active actions could have increased the probability of 
detection?    
As stated in section 2.4.1, the emergence of the AI-outbreaks in the Netherlands were felt by 
the poultry industry as if it was a new risk, coming out of the blue. However, there is much to 
say about this view.  
In 2002 and the beginning of 2003, AI outbreaks in domestic poultry were reported from the 
USA (low pathogenicity AI (LPAI) subtype H7N2) (Nolen, 2002), Chile (LPAI and HPAI 
subtype H7N3) (Rojas et al., 2002), and Italy (LPAI subtype H7N3) (Capua et al., 2002). So, 
in different areas around the world, and even close by in Europe, LPAI outbreaks occurred in 
the months preceding the outbreak in the Netherlands, but this did not lead to a higher level of 
preparedness or precautionary measures in the Netherlands. In a sense, one did not learn from 
the past because on several other occasions before the start of the epidemic in the Netherlands 
in 2003, e.g. in the USA (Bean et al., 1985), Mexico (Garcia et al. 1996), Italy (Capua and 
Marangon, 2000), Chile (Rojas et al., 2002), it has been shown that a HPAI-virus strains 
developed from a LPAI-virus strain by means of mutations mostly involving insertions near to 
the cleavage site. 
At that time, LPAI outbreaks were not considered as notifiable by the international 
community. However, due to the large epidemics in the Netherlands in 2003 and in Canada in 
2004, which started as an introduction of LPAI, the international community has changed its 
views and the new OIE-guidelines for the control and eradication of AI has also incorporated 
measures to fight LPAI infections of subtype H5 and H7.  
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In the year 2000, precautionary measures were indeed taken in the Netherlands due to the 
thread of a large HPAI-epidemic occurring in Italy in 1999-2000 (Capua and Marangon, 
2000). Stringent measures were established by the veterinary authorities in the Netherlands 
embodied by the Directive Flock Control Avian Diseases 2000, (DFCAD-2000). These 
measures were introduced to detect a possible AI-outbreak (including LPAI infections) as 
quickly as possible (Heijmans, 2000; Heijmans and Komijn, 2000). According to DFCAD-
2000, every poultry farmer was obliged to counsel his veterinary practitioner when a flock 
was treated due to a possible infectious disease or mortality of a flock was 0.5 % or more per 
24 hours. Call-in of the veterinary practitioner was also obliged when in reproduction flocks 
or layers the mean egg-production was decreased by 5% or more in a period of one week. The 
veterinary practitioner clinically inspected the flock and took 20 blood samples per poultry 
house for detection of antibodies against AI virus. The results of the clinical inspection were 
collected into a central database. Over 2000 examinations were performed on the basis of 
clinical signs exceeding the threshold-levels in a period of 5-6 months. At the end of 2000, 
when the HPAI epidemic in Italy was under control, the DFCAD-2000 in the Netherlands was 
dismantled. If the DFCAD-200 still would have been in operation in 2003, and poultry 
farmers would have adhered strictly to the notification thresholds, it can be speculated that 
detection of the first outbreaks could have happened much earlier. 
 
 
4.3  Conclusions and recommendations 
 
a) increased and progressive mortality should always be a signal to exclude AI in the 
differential diagnosis as cause of disease problems on poultry farms;  
b) intensive contact between the veterinary practitioner in the field and the veterinarian 
executing PME is much needed to have all relevant data and developments at ones disposal in 
order to come to a conclusive diagnosis;  
c) if clinical findings like high mortality suggest the possibility of HPAI, the pathologist 
should decide to submit clinical samples to the reference laboratory, even if PME gives no 
specific indications for HPAI;  
d) the best way for early detection of a HPAI outbreak is to have poultry farmer and/or 
veterinary practitioner report occurrence of high mortality or a large decrease in feed or water 
intake or a considerable drop in egg production immediately to the syndrome reporting system 
currently in operation;  
e) after the epidemic the syndrome reporting system continued to be in operation, but there is 
a small basis for it in practice: most farmers still ignore to notify a critical disease situation 
(Agrarisch Dagblad, 17 November 2004; Agrarisch Dagblad, 28 May 2005.). In many cases 
this is done with the argument that a notification will harm them economically (isolation of 
farm). Therefore, there is a definite need to facilitate the notification process. Part of the 
solution is that the isolation period of a poultry farm can be shortened due to the use of a 
PCR-test to exclude AI in a suspect situation (within 24 hours test result).    
g) it is recommended to sent tissue samples from poultry submitted for post-mortem 
examination at the Animal Health Service to the National Reference laboratory in case of an 
inconclusive diagnosis but with increased mortality as a reason for submission, in the case of 
a specific anamnesis (respiratory and/or digestive problems), or in the case of a diagnosis 
indicating respiratory problems. 
h) in order to detect low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) infections of subtype H5 or H7 
that could possibly change to HPAI, a continuous monitoring system has to be up, in which 
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high risk commercial poultry flocks (e.g. free-range and biological in the neighborhood of 
large ponds and lakes) are screened for antibodies against AI virus. Such a system has been 
set up in the Netherlands a year ago. In this system, serum samples are investigated for 
antibodies against AI-virus at the following sampling frequency:                                                                        
• broiler / quail / guinea-fowl / layer flocks once every year (30 samples); 
• duck / geese  flocks once every year (40 samples); 
• turkey flocks every production round (30 samples); 
• breeding animals once every year (30 samples);   
• poultry with free-range facilities : once every 3 months (30 samples). 
It should be clear that the operational sampling frequency is not at all adequate to detect as 
early as possible AI introduction in these flocks. For the high risk flocks a frequency of 
sampling of probably at least once a week is necessary to detect as early as possible AI 
introduction in these flocks. In that case there is a need to investigate whether other sample 
media (e.g. eggs) should be used in the monitoring system, in order to make the monitoring 
economically feasible. 
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5. Case study: Equine leukoencephalomalacia in 1989/1990 
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5.1 Case description 
 
The case 
 
Fumonisin are a recently described group of secondary metabolites produced by a specific 
group of Fusarium spp., particularly F. verticillioides and F. proliferatum. Human 
consumption of fumonisin contaminated maize and maize based products is associated with 
high levels of esophageal cancer in certain areas of the globe. The first reports of moldy 
maize, F. verticillioides and the causal role of fumonisin occurred late 1989/1990 when 
several cases of mortalities among horses and pigs were reported (for general reading see [1] 
and [2]). A more detailed description of those cases follows below. 
 
Large numbers of horses and pigs in the US died in the fall and winter of 1989-1990 after 
having been fed feedstuffs containing maize contaminated with fumonisin (see Table 5.1). 
 
Pathology Region # cases Reference 
Equine encephalomacalia, ELEM Arizona 66 8 
Porcine pulmonary edema, PPE Georgia 34 2 
ELEM East & Midwest 87 7 
PPE Iowa 43 5 
ELEM Iowa 55 6 
Table 5.1. Cases of equine encephalomacalia (ELEM) and porcine pulmonary edema (PPE) 
in the United States in 1989/1990 
 
This mortality occurred on a number of farms, including a breeding and training farm in 
Arizona where 18 out of 66 purebred Arabian horses were affected [8]. Of these 18 horses 14 
(=68%) died within 1 to 2 days, whilst the remaining 4 partially recovered [8]. These latter 
animals were mildly affected with impaired vision and devaited lips and noses [8]. Most 
animal 61/66 had been fed maize from two different batches. These batches consisted of cob 
parts, damaged kernels as well as undamaged kernels. 10 out the 14 animals that died were 
autopsied Gross pathological findings included liquefactive necrosis in parts of the cerebral 
white matter and hemorrhagic foci of various sizes in the brain stem. Portions of the 
cerebrum in some animals disintegrated when removed from the cranial vault [8]. 
The contaminated feed lots were removed from the diet at the onset of disease and animals 
that were fed only the uncontaminated lots did not become ill. 
 
Type of hazard  
 
Equine leukoencephalomalacia (ELEM) has been already known since 1891 as “circling 
disease” or “moldy corn poisoning”. Horsemen have known that moldy corn can cause 
severe neurological disorders and kill horses. Moldy corn is not uncommon, particularly 
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when corn is stressed by drought and/or insects. This is exacerbated by wet harvest 
conditions and when poor storage occurs. 
In conclusion, this is a re-emerging risk, but the causal relation between the mycotoxin 
fumonisin and the most prominent producer Fusarium verticillioides (syn. F. moniliforme) as 
F. proliferatum, as a second producer [4] is new. In 1970 F. verticillioides was identified as 
the most frequently occurring fungus in corn associated with ELEM but it took until 1988 
before the chemical structure and the biological activity of fumonisin were elucidated. These 
included experiments where ELEM could be experimentally induced after intravenous or oral 
administration of pure fumonisin [3]. 
 
Causes of plant stress 
 
Damage to the kernel by insects leads to an increased risk of reaching critical levels of the 
fungus and associated with that increased concentrations of the mycotoxin. Drought stress 
may lead to physical damage of the kernels thereby allowing the fungus to penetrate the 
tissue without having to cross any biological barriers. 
Strong variations in relative humidity impose stress to the fungus as it has been shown that 
growth and toxin production occur at different water potentials. E.g. growth occurs at 
relatively higher humidity whereas FB1 production still occurs at humidity levels where the 
fungus is unable to grow. F. verticillioides is commonly found in most seeds and the fungus 
is therefore regarded as an endophyte. This implies that the fungus is always there and the 
condition of the plant is decisive for the outcome of the balance between both. When 
conditions are such that the plant is weakened, the fungus will have an opportunity to disturb 
this equilibrium. 
 
Relevance to food safety  
 
High concentrations of fumonisin together with high densities of F. verticillioides are 
observed in two regions of the world (the Eastern Cape of South Africa and a region in 
North-East China). In both areas there is a high incidence of oesophageal cancer [3] This 
predominantly affects the local population that for food is largely dependent on the 
consumption of maize products.  The consumption of beer brewed from (moldy) maize is 
common practice in the Eastern Cape. This strongly enhances the health risk as it seems that 
alcohol facilitates easier absorption of fumonisin by body tissues, especially the oesophagus. 
 
International dimension 
 
EU policies measures have led to a preliminary tolerance limit of 1000 ppb fumonisin in 
various maize products. As a result, several maize-producing countries are unable to sell their 
products on the EU market at present. In the United Kingdom in 2003, all tested maize 
products originating from biological production were found to contain more fumonisin than 
allowed. Great Britain has recalled all these six tested brands of organic corn meal from its 
food stores after they were found to contain dangerous levels of fumonisin, a cancer-causing 
natural toxin produced by a fungus. The organic cornmeals were found to average as much 
9,000 parts per billion (ppb) fumonisin whereas the European Union's action limit range from 
2000 ppb in unprocessed maize to 200 ppb in processed maize-based foods for infants and 
young children and baby food (to become effective as of 01 October 2007). Ironically 5 out 
of 6 products originated grown maize grown in the UK or Denmark [9]. In contrast, the 
fumonisin concentration in maize products from conventional producers did not exceed the 
tolerance limit. 
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Political impact  
 
Secretary general Kofi Annan of the UN challenged the European regulation: 
 
“A World Bank study has calculated that the European Union 
regulation on aflatoxin costs Africa $670 million each year in 
exports of cereals, dried fruit and nuts. And what does it achieve? 
It may possibly save the life of one citizen of the European Union 
every two years........ Surely a more reasonable balance can be 
found” 
  
Stakeholder perceptions 
 
Relevant stakeholders have not been properly identified and data therefore are not available, 
but in view of the survey in the UK and the impact on trade from Africa this ought to be a 
factor of utmost importance 
 
Possible re-emergence of the risk 
 
Drought stress and stress caused by insects are very difficult to prevent, which also holds for 
many other forms of stress. Evidently the condition of the plant is of vital importance for the 
outcome of the interaction between plant and fungus. The re-emergence of ELEM, PPE and 
other pathologies in consumers of FB-contaminated corn and corn products is likely. GMO 
maize expressing the crystal protein gene from Bacillus thuringiensis showed good results in 
several field experiments. Breeding for resistance to drought stress seems to have good 
perspectives as well. 
 
Broader relevance 
 
Some of the conclusions from this case study should apply to a range of possible toxicoses, 
such as a general appreciation of the indicators rainfall, and different kinds of plant stress. 
 
 
 
5.2 Conclusions and recommendations 
 
Any indicator for plant stress could be helpful in early warning. Subsequently the procedures 
used during harvest and storage are vital for the final FB level in the commodity. These 
include fast and sufficient drying not only beyond the point where growth ceases, but beyond 
the humidity level where FB is no longer produced.  
Chemical analyses of batches suspect for the mycotoxin based on the above indicators could 
have eliminated the risk by re-routing these batches to other, less sensitive, animal species, 
since horses are particularly sensitive to fumonisins. Diversification of horse feeds and/or 
switching to other batches of maize/silage can avoid new cases of ELEM, as was shown in 
the Arizona case [8]. 
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6.1 Case description 
 
6.1.1 Introduction 
 
This case study pertains to the development of the response to a study on the occurrence of 
environmental contaminants, including PCBs and dioxins, in cultured salmon.  The global 
production and consumption of cultured salmon has gone through a rapid growth in the past 
twenty years.  The possible impact of negative reactions of consumers on the production of- 
and trade in- salmon can therefore be substantial. 
 
The study on the occurrence of contaminants in cultured salmon was published in the 
scientific journal Science in January 2004.  In this study, the occurrence of a group of 
organochlorine contaminants, which are PCBs, dioxins, and two pesticides, was investigated 
in farmed and wild salmon from different regions.  Based on these results, the authors 
quantitatively estimated the likelihood of cancer to occur, based upon which they issued a 
consumption advice.  This pertained in particular to cultured salmon because the levels herein 
were higher than in wild salmon. 
 
This study and the advice by the authors received a lot of attention in the media and led to 
reactions from the public, among others in Northern America.  There were also reactions from 
the authorities and the fish industry.  From these reactions, it became evident that the subject 
had sensitivity among the public.  Authorities in general responded by indicating that the 
study confirmed the results of monitoring previously carried out by them and that the reported 
values were below the legal thresholds.  Some authorities also pointed at the positive health 
effects of salmon consumption.  The industry responded, among others by pointing at its 
efforts towards reducing contamination of fish feed as much as possible.  Also the 
contribution of other foodstuffs to the intake of dioxins and PCBs was mentioned with the 
purpose of putting the contribution by consumption of salmon into a broader perspective. 
 
The risk of cancer by exposure to organochlorine compounds was known at the start of the 
study.  Also studies on the occurrence of organochlorine compounds in cultured and wild 
salmon had previously been performed, albeit at a smaller scale.  New elements in this study 
were the scale at which the tests had been carried out in different regions; the calculation 
method that the authors had employed for estimation of risk; and the consumption advice that 
had been issued by the authors.  In addition, the results had previously been published in more 
specialized scientific journals than Science, and therefore had been available to a smaller 
target audience. 
 
In summary, the case pertained to a risk that had already been known and that acquired a 
greater dimension by a new interpretation by scientists and perception among citizens that 
previously might not have been informed about the contamination of fish.  Practice has shown 
that “re-emergence” of the problem is possible.  Actually, the same authors as those of the 
Science article have published another article on the contamination of salmon with flame 
retardants (PDBEs; Hites et al., 2004b).  This study did not arouse as many reactions as did 
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the article on organochlorine compounds.  The organochlorine compounds can serve as model 
for a series of similar environmental contaminants that are transferred from fish feed to fish 
destined for consumption. 
 
6.1.2 Scientific background 
 
Hites and co-workers (2004a) studied the concentrations of various contaminants, which are 
12 organochlorine pesticides, PCBs and dioxins, in salmon fillets.  A distinction needs being 
made between cultured salmon and salmon fillets that were obtained from retailers.  The 
salmon’s origins were Europe, North- and South-America.  In total, 246 composite samples (3 
fish or fillets per sample) were analyzed. 
 
Overall, the levels of 13 out of 14 contaminants were significantly higher in cultured fish with 
respect to wild fish.  Four representative contaminants were subsequently studied in more 
detail, i.e. PCBs, dioxins, toxaphene, and dieldrin.  The levels of these contaminants were the 
highest in cultured salmon from Europe, that is, from Scotland and the Far Øer islands, 
whereas cultured salmon from the US state of Washington and from Chile showed lower 
levels.  In fish bought from super markets, a similar difference was observed between Europe 
and North- and South-America.  The samples with the lowest levels of contamination 
predominantly originated from wild salmon.  These trends showed parallels with salmon feed 
from various regions, which is considered as the most probable source of the differences.  
This type of feed contains, among others, fish meal and fish oil, in which the previously 
mentioned contaminants can accumulate themselves through the biological feed chain. 
 
Although the threshold values of the American Food and Drug Administration for PCBs and 
dieldrin had not been exceeded, the authors carried out a risk estimation for the observed 
residue values.  This was because the FDA has not imposed threshold values for toxaphene 
and dioxins.  The authors also stated that the threshold values of the FDA for the other 
contaminants have not been solely based on health aspects.  For the estimation of risk, the 
researchers employed a model that is used by the American Environmental Protection Agency 
for consumption of fish and the associated risk on cancer by PCBs, dieldrin, and toxaphene.  
This model was focused, among others, on the risks of consumption of fish caught in the 
environment, such as sport fishers and aboriginal inhabitants of nature reserves.  The authors 
employed this model in order to calculate the number of fish-containing meals that could be 
consumer “safely”.  For cultured salmon in general and most of the salmon purchased from 
the super markets, this amounted to one meal per month, while for European cultured salmon 
in particular, this amounted to half a meal per month (once per two months).  The 
recommended frequency of consumption of wild salmon was higher, ranging from one to 
eight meals per month (Hites et al., 2004a).  Later re-calculations showed that even more 
stringent advice should be given, also for wild salmon, if a cancer risk of only 1*10-5 is 
considered acceptable (Foran et al., 2005).  The method of calculation for the risk of cancer 
differs between the EPA and many other international organizations. 
 
Prior to the study by Hites and co-workers (2004a), several studies into the levels of 
contamination of cultured salmon with organochlorine compounds had already been 
conducted.  These studies had been conducted at a smaller scale with less samples, among 
others in Canada (Easton et al., 2002) and Scotland (Jacobs et al., 2002).  One of the most 
important conclusions of these earlier studies was that the levels of contaminants in cultured 
salmon correlated with those in salmon feed, into which contaminated fish had been 
processed, among others. 
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6.1.3 Reactions after publication of the study 
 
The publication of the study by Hites and co-workers in Science led to a response from 
various sources. 
 
Consumers 
After reports had appeared in the media about the study published in Science, sales of 
cultured salmon to consumers declined in some nations, such as France and Canada (Fisheries 
and Oceans Canada, 2005; Hénard, 2004).  This decline was in the order of magnitude of tens 
of percents.  In other nations, such as England and Netherlands, the sales of cultured salmon 
would not have experienced any backlashes according to media reports (BBC, 2004; Marine 
Harvest, 2004). 
 
Environmental movements 
Interest groups that are focused on the environment responded negatively, such as the 
American “Environmental Working Group” that called upon the FDA to impose more 
rigorous health standards for salmon, demanded labeling of cultured salmon, and advised 
consumers to eat wild salmon instead of cultured salmon (EWG, 2004). 
 
Authorities 
The American authorities, such as FDA and EPA, have been cited in the media; however, 
official responses could not be traced on the websites of these institutions.  The employed 
model was withdrawn by the EPA from its website.  In general, the FDA stated that there was 
no reason for concern and the observed levels were below the limits imposed by the FDA.  On 
the other hand, the EPA regarded this study as an opportunity to make choices about which 
kind of fish the consumer would prefer to eat (for example, Stokstad, 2004).  The response of 
the Canadian ministry of health had a similar content as that of the FDA (Health Canada, 
2004). 
 
The reactions of European authorities in general pointed in the same direction.  The British 
Food Standards Agency (FSA) pointed at the fact that the measured levels corresponded with 
those that previously had been measured during surveillance programs in Great Britain, and 
that they fell within internationally defined limits.  In these results, Scottish salmon would not 
show differences between wild and cultured variants.  The FSA also pointed out that the 
calculation method for the cancer risk, as employed by Hites and co-workers (2004a), has not 
yet been recognized internationally, and that also health-beneficial effects are associated with 
the consumption of fat fish.  Moreover, a decreasing trend in contamination of fish has 
become noticeable in the past years.  The FSA did not deviate from its previous advice to 
consume fish twice a week, including fat fish once a week (less for mothers; FSA, 2004). 
 
Of more or less similar meaning was the advice of the French national food authority 
(“Agence Française de Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments”; AFSSA, 2004).  Also the Dutch 
national food authority (“Voedsel en Waren Autoriteit”) concluded that the contamination 
levels in fish are followed by monitoring programs and that the consumption of fish offers 
more health benefits than disadvantages (VWA, 2004). 
 
The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) published a risk assessment in 2005, instigated 
by the study in Science.  While the assessment mentioned the issues that had also been treated 
by the national authorities, it also went into the contamination with methylmercury, the 
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comparatively high levels in fish from the Baltic Sea, and the fact that the study in Science 
had not taken season-dependent variability into account (EFSA, 2005). 
 
Industry 
Industrial interest organizations, such as “Salmon of the Americas” (SOTA, 2004), called the 
study results misleading.  It was pointed to the fact that, among others, other foodstuffs, such 
as meat and milk, contribute more to the intake of organochlorine compounds by consumers 
than salmon.  Also, reference was made to the health benefits of the consumption of salmon.  
In addition, the efforts of the industry towards decreasing the fraction of fish meal and fish oil 
in fish feed, as well as the level of environmental contaminants, were mentioned. 
 
6.1.4 Developments 
 
After the publication of the article in Science, the same group of authors has published results 
of analyses of other contaminants in salmon, which are heavy metals and brominated flame 
retardants.  For metals, it was concluded that no consistent difference was observed between 
wild and cultured salmon (Foran et al., 2004). 
 
The study on brominated biphenyl ethers (PDBEs), a widely used group of flame retardants, 
yielded in essence the same pattern as for the organochlorine compounds: levels in European 
culture fish were higher than in those from North- and South-America, while cultured fish as 
a whole had higher levels than wild salmon.  An exception to this was one type of wild 
salmon, the “chinook” salmon, which also contained high levels of PDBEs.  According to the 
authors, the cause of this deviation lies in the fact that this salmon primarily feeds upon other 
fish and reaches a higher size.  The levels in fish feed corresponded with the trend in PBDE 
levels in salmon itself (Foran et al., 2004). 
 
The study on PDBEs shows that the results for organochlorine compounds can be 
extrapolated to compounds with similar properties, such as PCBs and PDBEs. 
 
In addition, the same author group has conducted a recalculation of the risk estimation, in 
which the effect of the intake of fish on the exposure to organochlorine compounds was 
considered.  For this, the “Tolerable Daily Intake” established by the WHO [1 pg 2,3,7,8-
tetrachloro-dibenzo-p-dioxin equivalents (TEQ)/kg body weight/day] and the background of 
intake from other foodstuffs were taken into account (Foran et al., 2005). 
 
These studies were, however, published in specialized scientific journals with predominantly 
scientists as the target audience. 
 
 
6.2 Pro-activity paying off and lacking pro-activity  
 
As can be inferred from the data summarized above, authorities already had in place 
monitoring and surveillance programs for various contaminants for a long period before the 
publication of the study in Science.  In addition, it was known from scientific literature that 
organochlorine compounds could accumulate through the biological feed chain and through 
fish feed into fatty tissue of fish.  Also the toxicity of these compounds had been described 
and legal measures had been taken, in particular in the European Union, in order to protect the 
citizens against negative health effects. 
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The problem appears to have arisen from the combination of the following factors: 
o Focus. According to criticisms, the study focused on a single foodstuff that might on 
one hand contain a comparatively high level of organochlorine compounds, but that 
on the other hand is consumed to a limited extent as compared to other foodstuffs 
containing the same contaminants.  Authorities and industry also referred to the 
benefits of fish consumption for health.  In this regard, there would have been a need 
for a “holistic view.” 
o Interpretation of results of measurements:  The model that was employed by the 
authors of the article in Science yielded other results than would have been 
considered acceptable based upon, for example, the TDI.  Furthermore, the results 
were presented in this case as consumption advice, which is also transparent for non-
insiders and which directly affect the behavior of consumers. 
o Scope: the target audience of the journal Science is probably bigger than that of 
specialist scientific journals and reports on surveillance.  Possibly, this medium 
reaches a wider audience, which has not been previously informed on this matter.  
Moreover, the high-ranking status of the journal can play a role in this.  The 
reputation of the journal also has caused the regular newspapers to take on this topic. 
o Other incidents and “issues” that played on the background, like the association of 
cannibalism among animals with danger for food safety (among others, BSE, “fish 
eats fish”), environmental aspects of fish culture and the like. 
o Market trends.  The culture and consumption of salmon has firmly increased over the 
last few years. 
 
 
6.3 Conclusions and recommendations  
 
Possible actions by policy makers with regard to food safety should perhaps pertain more to 
risk communication than to the mitigation of the risk per se, given that for the latter, 
initiatives are already being undertaken. 
 
For the communication, the factors mentioned above can be taken into account.  This should 
be done in a pro-active manner.  A communication strategy can be developed in advance in 
collaboration with “stakeholders”.  Communication and education on a regular basis, for 
example by the “Voedingscentrum,” probably will aid preventing a “crisis” situation 
surrounding similar problems. 
 
The opinion of food safety experts about possible future problems can also be solicited.  The 
Dutch national food authority (“Voedings en Waren Autoriteit”), for example, recently 
applied the “expert choice” method to risks in cultured salmon.  Experts of the Dutch national 
food authority’s inspectorate for food and consumer products (VWA/KvW), the institute of 
fisheries research (RIVO), RIKILT-Institute of Food Safety, the national institute of public 
health and environment (RIVM), and Nutreco indicated how big they estimated the likelihood 
and impact for chemical, microbiological and physical hazards.  Of the 33 items, 
organochlorine compounds had the highest score based on the formula “risk = likelihood * 
impact,” followed by Listeria monocytogenes, noxious metals, and antibiotics, respectively 
(VWA, 2005). 
 
In addition, contaminants in food, for which similar problems can occur as for organochlorine 
compounds, can be pro-actively identified.  Indicators that, in combination with each other, 
can facilitate the early identification of similar problems include the following items: 
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o Contaminants for which accumulation may occur through environment, biological 
feed chain, or recycling (“fish eats fish”) 
o Contaminants of which the levels in products lie comparatively little below the 
internationally established thresholds and that can exceed these thresholds by 
adaptations of the thresholds (for example, if the threshold for dioxins is lowered from 
4 to 2 pg TEQ/kg bw/day).  In other words, compounds for which an increased 
likelihood exists that the interpretations of risks can differ among different experts. 
o Compounds for which many toxicological studies are conducted, which can cause 
standards setting to change quickly based on progress in insight.  This holds 
particularly true for, among others, effects of combinations of substances. 
o Products with a strong health image, of which contaminations can become a sensitive 
item for the public. 
o Products of which the production and consumption are strongly increasing. 
o Products for which an alternative production technology is increasingly applied, by 
which also the risk on contamination with specific contaminants is increased. 
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7. Case study: Perfluorinated contaminants, a new group of contaminants 
that accumulate in fish 
 
Stefan P.J. van Leeuwen 
RIVO, Animal Sciences Group, Wageningen University and Research Center 
 
7.1 Case description   
 
The first papers on perfluorinated compounds (PFCs) as emerging chemical contaminants 
have been published in 2001 [1, 2]. PFCs find a wide variety of applications as surface active 
compounds (PFOS: perfluoroctanesulfonate) in e.g. fire fighting foams, paints, skiwax and as 
polymerisation aid (PFOA: perfluooctanoic acid) in the production of PTFE (Teflon). Teflon 
has widespread applications in e.g. industries and households (e.g. anticaking layer in frying 
pans). PFCs enter the environment during production of the compounds and during and after 
the use of products in which they have been applied. Besides, volatile PFC precursors are 
transported in air over large distances. Through biological and chemical processes in the 
environment PFCs may be generated, resulting in another source of these compounds. 
Production of PFOS has been stopped on a voluntary basis by USA based industries since 
2000. However, currently alternative compounds are being produced and applied that strongly 
resemble the above compounds. As a result, the group of PFCs produced by industries and 
being reported in literature consists of >10 compounds and is growing [3]. 
Since the discovery in 2001, mainly groups in North America have been publishing on the 
levels and distribution of these compounds in the (aquatic) environment [1, 2, 4, 5]. However, 
publications on human toxicity of these compounds are scarce. Available reports of producers 
(e.g. 3M) and independent research laboratories show that exposure to PFCs is found to be 
carcinogenic in rats, inducing tumors of the liver, and of the thyroid and mammary glands [6].  
There is limited information available on the presence of PFCs in the Dutch and European 
environment. Concerning food, there is no data on the presence of these compounds in food 
items (except for some fish samples), which hampers the evaluation of human intake and 
therefore human risk assessment. 
The case of PFCs has developed similarly as those from other commercially produced 
chemicals such as polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and brominated flame retardants 
(BFRs).During several decades, these chemicals are being produced and applied in consumer 
and industrial products. After several years (see Diagram 7.1), independent research results 
show that these chemicals have adverse effects. Following these findings, (international) 
governmental bodies can decide to ban the production and use of the chemical by legislative 
measures. In parallel to above process, industries have already started to develop alternative 
products with similar properties, often based on similar chemistry (as this requires only slight 
modifications of production processes). In the case of PFCs, PFOS has been used in the past 
as surfactant. 3M has banned the production of PFOS since some years, but now produces a 
very similar compound: PFBS (perfluorobutanesulfonate).  
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Diagram 7.1 Pattern of emergence of new chemical contaminants. 
 
7.2 Pro-activity paying off and lacking pro-activity  
 
The presence and accumulation of PFCs in occupationally exposed workers at production 
facilities is regarded an early indicator of a potential human exposure risk. The problem of 
PFCs was initially detected by accumulation of PFOS in occupationally exposed workers in a 
PFOS production plant. PFOS was found at 100-1000fold higher levels in blood compared to 
non-occupationally exposed people [7]. In the case of PFOA, the occupational exposure was 
only detected after decades of production. Industry (Dupont) was fined by the EPA recently 
for mischievously withholding test information that showed transfer of PFOA to the human 
foetus and PFOA exposure of people living in the vicinity of a manufacturing site [8]. In 
conclusion, industries do not necessarily show pro-activity with unwelcome information on 
exposure and toxicity of their chemicals. Research by independent institutes and pressure of 
(inter)national authorities is required to accurately respond to these potential new chemical 
risks. The sooner new chemicals are captured in legislation, the lower are the chances that 
they can become ubiquitous in global environment through extensive production and use.  
RIVO participates in the EU research project PERFORCE (www.science.uva.nl/perforce). 
This project targets at an inventory of distribution of PFCs in the European aquatic 
environment, including food chain analysis, point source research and the development of 
analytical quality control tools. Research has shown that PFCs are widespread in the 
European environment, including the Dutch aquatic system [9].  
PFCs are also found in Dutch commercial fish, partly due to a PFC production facility at the 
Scheldt river in Antwerp, Belgium. Within the PERFORCE project, no attention will be paid 
to human risk assessment. No research will be carried out to levels of PFCs in food items 
(other than fish). It is therefore necessary to make an inventory of levels of PFCs in foods of 
various origins in order to determine possible risks for human consumption. The research gap 
 61
Emerging Risks in the food chain - Case study: PFCs in wild-catch fish 
 
on PFCs has been recognised by EFSA, who has started a working group on evaluation of 
PFOS and its salts  
(http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/contam/contam_meetings/977/contam_12th_plenmeet_minute
s1.pdf and also http://www.efsa.eu.int/register/qr_panels_11_en.html).  
Concerning future (PFC) chemicals a range of patents provide industries with possibilities to 
produce ‘new’ or very alike alternative chemicals for those that have been banned [10]. A 
pro-active approach will facilitate the determination of the adverse effects of these chemicals 
in an early stage.  This approach should consist of (1st) making a desk study of publicly 
available data (yearly production volume, patents, fields of application) on manufacturers of 
high production volume chemicals (HPVCs). A list of possible (PFC) substances will result 
from this study, which will be judged for their toxicological relevance. Secondly, biological 
and chemical screening methods can be employed to identify prioritised chemical substances 
and to determine the levels in the environment and food. This proactive approach would 
determine risks in an early stage and prevent that risks are discovered ‘by accident’. Such an 
integrated system is currently not in place, although several elements are covered by 
(inter)national institutes and governmental bodies. Therefore, it is required to integrate 
activities. Also, the development of powerful analytical chemical and biological screening 
techniques is required. 
 
7.3 Conclusions  
 
To conclude, PFCs are a new class of compounds that require a human risk assessment 
consisting of: 
• Evaluation of toxicity of the individual PFCs 
• Assessment of the food contamination path-ways and the determination of t6heir 
levels in important food groups 
• Human intake assessment 
Furthermore, a pro-active approach towards new classes of (PFC) chemicals will prevent the 
accidental discovery of toxic high production chemicals. Several elements are currently in 
place at (inter)national bodies but should be integrated and further developed.    
 
7.4 References 
 
1. Giesy, J.P. and K. Kannan, Global distribution of perfluorooctane sulfonate in wildlife. 
Environmental Science & Technology, 2001. 35(7): p. 1339-1342. 
2. Kannan, K., et al., Accumulation of perfluorooctane sulfonate in marine mammals. 
Environmental science & technology, 2001. 35: p. 1593-1598. 
3. Martin, J.W., et al., Identification of long-chain perfuorinated acids in biota from the 
Canadian Arctic. Environmental Science & Technology, 2004. 38(2): p. 373-380. 
4. Tomy, G.T., et al., Fluorinated organic compounds in an eastern Arctic marine food web. 
Environmental Science & Technology, 2004. 38(24): p. 6475-6481. 
5. Moody, C.A., et al., Monitoring perfluorinated surfactants in biota and surface water 
samples following an accidental release of fire-fighting foam into Etobicoke Creek. 
Environmental science and technology, 2002. 36(4): p. 545-551. 
6. OECD, Draft assessment of perfluorooctane sulfonate and its salts, ENV/JM/EXCH(2002) 
8, Paris, France. 2002. 
7. Hekster, F.M., et al., Perfluoroalkylated substances - Aquatic environmental assessment. 
2002, Rijksinstituut voor kust en zee/RIKZ: Den Haag. p. 99. 
8. USA Today, Dupont to pay $10.25M fine, $6.25 M for research - Settlement sets EPA 
record, 15 December 2005 
 62
Emerging Risks in the food chain - Case study: PFCs in wild-catch fish 
 
9. Schrap, S.M., A.M.P.M. Pijnenburg, and R.B. Geerdink, Geperfluoreerde verbindingen in 
het Nederlandse oppervlaktewater. 2004, RIZA/RIKZ: Lelystad. 
10. Het Financieele Dagblad, Nieuwe vervuiling met oude patenten, 21 January 2006 
 
 
 63
